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COMMENTS
PERSONAL SERVICES ABOUT THE HOME
INTRODUCTION

"[A] ccording to the elevated morality of the civil law, no one
ought to enrich himself at the expense of another."' From the
cases considered in this Comment it is manifest that this principle applies when one renders to another nursing, boarding,
and sundry other personal services about the home.2 The rendition of such services presents three basic situations in which
this principle may be invoked. First, if no recompense has been
made to the renderer during the life of the recipient,3 the former
may file a claim against the latter's estate to recover for the
services. Next, an onerous donation made on condition the donee
support the donor for a certain time may be attacked after the
donee has rendered services in compliance with the charge of
support. Finally, a remunerative donation made in recognition
of past services may be attacked by either the donor or his heirs.
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE OF RECIPIENT IN ABSENCE OF DONATION

To RENDERER

4

Contracts Implied in Fact, Quantum Meruit,
and Quasi-ContractDistinguished
If there is an agreement for services and compensation which
1. Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La. Ann. 197,198 (1846).
2. The methods of recovery for such services will be discussed. These include remunerative and onerous donations, contracts implied in fact and law,
and quantum meruit. The writer is aware that the different methods of recovery
discussed in this Comment are quite disconnected. However, they are treated
together, for regardless of the legal principles applicable, the invocation of each
arises from the same factual situation, i.e., services have been rendered about the
home without formal contract.
Although some reference will be made to French law on the subject, a comparison of Louisiana law with the common law jurisdictions will not be made.
The primary reason is that Louisiana law in this area is based for the most part
on civil law theories, especially the French. When it differs, a Louisiana innovation has usually been engrafted upon the civil law, with no common law counterpart. E.g., LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1526 (1870).
Without the coverage of this Comment are personal services for repair and
upkeep of buildings, yards, etc.; legal, medical, and other professional services;
services performed in a business such as clerk, salesman, supervisor, etc.; and
services of a mandatary or agent.
3. Throughout this Comment, the party receiving the services will be referred
to as the "recipient," and the party rendering the services, as the "renderer."
4. It should be noted that any suit against an estate based on parol evidence
[416]
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is not expressed, an implied-in-fact contract may be proved.5
This is done by establishing that under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case there was an implied agreement that
services were to be rendered and compensation received for
them. 6 Consequently, the recipient is under a duty to pay, and

the renderer has a right to payment. Once the implied-in-fact
contract is proved, the same principles that govern express contracts apply.
Parties may agree either expressly or impliedly that services
are to be rendered and recompensed without specifically agreeing to the amount of recompense. There will then be a right in
the renderer to be compensated with a correlative duty in the
recipient to compensate, and the question is simply one of quantum. In such a case, recovery must be on the amount deserved
(quantum meruit).7 A plaintiff must prove an agreement for
services and payment before being allowed to prove the value of
his services. 8 Recovery can never exceed the fair and reasonable
must comply with the requirements of LA. R.S. 13:3721-3722 (1950). These statutes provide in part that suit may be initially brought to recover a debt owed by
a deceased against his estate only within one year of the death of the deceased
if parol evidence is necessary to prove the debt. In this event, the debt of the
deceased must be proved by the testimony of at least one credible witness besides
the claimant, plus other corroborating circumstances.
See generally Note, 22
LA. L. REV. 838 (1962).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1816 (1870). See also id. arts. 1766, 1811, 1903.
6. See, e.g., Beall v. Bibber, 19 La. Ann. 434, 435 (1867) ("When one renders
services beneficial to another, at his request, an implied contract is raised for
remuneration.") ; Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La. Ann. 197, 198 (1846) ("For actions
without words, either written or spoken, are presumptive evidence of a contract,
when they are done under circumstances that naturally imply a consent to such
contract."); Succession of Burgierres, 12 La. App. 66, 125 So. 320 (lst Cir.
1929) ("[A]n agreement may be inferred to pay from the nature of the services
rendered, and the relations of the parties."); Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App.
663 (lst Cir. 1927).
7. E.g., Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 257, 5 So. 2d 762, 764 (1941)
("[I]t is not necessary that the value of the services shall have been agreed
upon by the employer and employee."). Although dictum, the language of the
court in Succession of Gesselly, 216 La. 731, 741, 44 So. 2d 838, 841 (1950)
points this out very well: "[S]ince the [deceased] had . . . placed this evaluation
on the services rendered by her nephew, the question of quantum meruit does not
enter. That would enter only if the value of the services had not been fixed."
See Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 209 (1957), for a general discussion of quantum
meruit and its development in Louisiana.
8. Condran v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 1202, 9 So. 31 (1891)
Bright v. Metairie Cemetery Association, 33 La. Ann. 58 (1881); Duncan v.
Blackman, 3 La. App. 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1926) ("In order for plaintiff to recover
judgment against defendant on a quantum meruit it must appear that there was
a contract express or implied between them."). Although none of these cases
dealt with services rendered about the home, they clearly express the rule that
the contract must be proven first in order to recover on quantum meruit. The
rule should be the same for any type of services rendered. Succession of Francke,
219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951), a case which did concern such services, appears
to conform to this rule. The court there said: "Where such promise or intent
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value of the services.'
Recovery may be allowed under the theory of quasi-contract,
or contract implied in law, if services have been rendered where
there is neither an express nor an implied-in-fact contract, but
the recipient or his estate would be unjustly enriched if not
made to return an equivalent amount.' 0 Unlike quantum. meruit,
recovery is here limited, at least theoretically, to the extent of
enrichment of the recipient, even should this be less than the
fair value of the services." Hence, the purpose of recovery on
a quasi-contract basis is prevention of unjust enrichment of the
recipient or his estate.
[by a parent to compensate a child for services rendered] can be established and
the nature of the services performed is proven, the Court will proceed to the
question of quantum." Id. at 293, 52 So. 2d at 857.
9. E.g., Succession of Twohey, 222 La. 697, 63 So. 2d 429 (1953) ; Succession
of Francke, 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2292-2294 (1870).
Cf. id. arts. 1965, 2301. See
generally Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36
TUL. L. REV. 605 (1962), 37 TUL. L. REV. 49 (1962). Here again, there is a
right in the renderer to compensation, and a correlative duty in the recipient to
make remuneration. Technically, the justification for this is the assumption that
had the renderer not performed the services, the recipient would have had to hire
someone to do so. This is recognized in at least one case, Succession of Pereuilhet,
23 La. Ann. 294, 295 (1871) ("[T]he estate of [deceased] was considerably enriched by [opponent's services]. If he had hired other servants and nurses, the
amount coming to the heirs who now resist her claim would have been considerably reduced.") And in another case, Succession of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185, 188
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) (although not involving quasi-contract since the court
found that the parties intended there be remuneration), the court noted: "[Tlhe
deceased needed these services and the claimant faithfully attended to her needy
father, and had she not rendered him the services she did, it would have been
necessary for him to pay some one else for the same services far more than she is
claiming."
11. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 937B (1959) ("The plaintiff cannot
claim more than the impoverishment suffered by him, for the action has the character of an indemnity; but he cannot obtain more than the enrichment procured
for the defendant, for the latter has only the obligation to restore what he has
received without cause. There is, therefore, a double limitation on the amount
of the reparation.") ; David, Unjustified Enrichment in French Law, 5 CAMn.
L.J. 205, 222 (1934) (The amount recoverable under the civil law theory of
unjust enrichment "must not exceed the enrichment of the defendant or the impoverishment of the plaintiff, whichever is smaller.") (Note, 19 LA. L. REV. 900,
901 (1959) gives a concise statement of the common law rules relating to contracts implied in law and fact, quantum meruit, quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment.) The practical importance of this limitation is minimal, for the extent
of the unjust enrichment of the recipient will usually be the fair and reasonable
value of the renderer's services. Consequently, the courts often do not clearly
make this distinction.
Nor do the courts clearly differentiate the doctrines. In Succession of Pereuilbet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 295 (1871), the court said: "No one is readily presumed
to give such useful and tedious labors except under a quasi-contract for a fair
compensation." (Emphasis added.) However, the court then went on to say that
the deceased's estate was "considerably enriched" by plaintiff's services, and thus
there was "a quasi-contract on the part of the deceased to compensate the opponent for the services mentioned." Ibid. For other cases where the doctrines were
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Intention To Compensate

The general rule regulating recovery of compensation (as
distinguished from unjust enrichment) 12 by the renderer against
the succession of the recipient is that both renderer and recipient must have intended compensation would be paid for the
services.'5 In determining this intention factors of prime importance seem to be the nature of the services and the relationship
of the parties. 14 A promise or intimation 15 by the recipient that
apparently confused, see, e.g., Succession of Burgant, 148 La. 1041, 88 So. 391
(1921) ; Succession of McNamara, 48 La. Ann. 45, 18 So. 908 (1896) ; Dauenhauer v. Succession of Browne, 47 La. Ann. 341, 16 So. 827 (1895) ; Gaines v.
Del Campo, 30 La. Ann. 245 (1878) ; Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La. Ann. 197 (1846) ;
Brown v. Lagemann's Succession, 192 So. 543 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939) ; Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924).
12. If recovery is sought on a quasi-contract basis, there is no necessity for
finding the parties intended compensation, i.e., there need be no contract, express
or implied, for remuneration. Here, the purpose of recovery is the prevention of
unjust enrichment of the recipient or his estate, and recovery is limited to the
actual enrichment. However, the courts often fail to distinguish between recovery
on a quasi-contract basis and recovery on contract implied in fact or quantum
meruit. See note 11 supra.
The only two cases found in which recovery seems to have been properly
allowed on a quasi-contractual basis are Succession of McNamara, 48 La. Ann.
45, 18 So. 908 (1896) and Gaines v. Del Campo, 30 La. Ann. 245 (1878). In
neither case did the court specifically mention quasi-contract as the basis of recovery, but the court merely articulated allowance of a quantum meruit (reasonable value of services).
13. Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762 (1941) ; Succession of
Arnold, 178 La. 658, 152 So. 322 (1933) ; Farrar v. Johnson, 172 La. 30, 133
So. 352 (1931) ; Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930) ; Succession
of Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267 (1927) ; Succession of Pons, 142 La. 721, 77
So. 515 (1918) ; Succession of Templeman, 134 La. 798, 64 So. 718 (1914);
Succession of Oubre, 109 La. 516, 33 So. 583 (1903) ; Succession of Benton, 106
La. 494, 31 So. 123 (1901) ; Adams v. Succession of Mills, 49 La. Ann. 775, 22
So. 257 (1897) ; Succession of Guidry, 40 La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888);
Gaines v. Del Campo, 30 La. Ann. 245 (1878) ; Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La. Ann.
197 (1846) ; Story v. Story, 131 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Succession
of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) ; Succession of Savant, 132
So. 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931) ; Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App. 663 (1st Cir.
1927) ; Wall v. Heslin, 2 Orl. App. 112 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905) ; Succession of
Schulte, 1 Orl. App. 70 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1903).
A stale claim, or suit on an afterthought will not be sufficient. Succession of
Oliver, 184 La. 26, 165 So. 318 (1936) (not services rendered about home case) ;
Succession of Burgant, 148 La. 1041, 88 So. 391 (1921) ; Succession of Daste,
125 La. 657, 51 So. 677 (1910) ; Succession of Oubre, 109 La. 516, 33 So. 583
(1903); Dauenhauer v. Succession of Browne, 47 La. Ann. 341, 16 So. 827
(1895) ; Gaines v. Del Campo, 30 La. Ann. 245 (1878) ; Burger v. Larman, 4
Orl. App. 158 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1907).
Succession of Oubre, 109 La. 516, 33 So. 583 (1903) intimated that there
might be no intention to charge when the services were commenced, but that later
such an intention might arise. Presumably, recovery should be limited to the
services rendered after there was an intention to charge.
14. Succession of Burgierres, 12 La. App. 66, 125 So. 320 (1st Cir. 1929)
("[A]n agreement may be inferred to pay from the nature of the services rendered, and the relations of the parties."). (Emphasis added.) Further support
for the statement in the text may be found in note 18 infra.
15. Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App. 663 (1st Cir. 1927). But mere hope of
the renderer that the recipient will reward him in his will is not sufficient. Suc-
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he will remember the renderer in his will suffices to show an
intention that payment be made. 16 The intention requirement is
not, of course, limited to claims against the recipient's succession ; the governing principle is that claims for services rendered17
to a decedent derive no added validity by reason of his demise.
Sundry Rules Regarding the Services Rendered
The burden rests upon the claimant to prove the services
were rendered.' 8 If the recipient has contributed to the rendercession of Schulte, 1 Orl. App. 70 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1903).

However, in this

situation recovery might properly be allowed on a quasi-contract basis. See note
12 supra.
16. The rule is well stated in a recent court of appeal case, as follows: "One
who renders valuable services to another for a number of years under the promise
that these services will be rewarded after the death of the person to whom the
services were rendered is entitled to recover . . . the reasonable value of the services where no specific amount was agreed upon and no remuneration has been
made." Story v. Story, 131 So. 2d 913, 916 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). Accord,
Succession of Gesselly, 216 La. 731, 44 So. 2d 838 (1950) ; Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762 (1941) ; Succession of Oliver, 184 La. 26, 165
So. 318 (1936) ; Succession of Palmer, 137 La. 190, 68 So. 405 (1915) ; Gaines
v. Del Campo, 30 La. Ann. 245 (1878); Nimmo v. Walker, 14 La. Ann. 581
(1859) ; Succession of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) ; Succession of Peres, 174 So. 130 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937). Contra, Caldwell v.
Turner, 129 La. 19, 55 So. 695 (1911) ; Succession of Savant, 132 So. 263 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1931). Succession of Savant, supra, relied on LA. CIVIL CODE art.
1814 (1870), which provides that: "Unequivocal words, expressive of mere intent,
do not make an obligation." Brown v. Lagemann's Succession, 192 So. 543 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1939) appears to accord with this minority view. It is submitted
that these minority cases should not be followed. Recovery should be allowed, at
least on a quasi-contractual basis, to prevent the unjust enrichment of the recipient's estate. (The court in the Brown case, supra, did intimate that if plaintiff
had pleaded "quantum meruit" in the alternative, he might have recovered. Actually, quasi-contract should have had to be pleaded in the alternative since the court
found that there was no contract, express or implied, for remuneration, so that
quantum meruit was not applicable.)
Of interest in this area is Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762
(1941). Here, the recipient promised to reward the renderer in his will. Recovery was allowed even after the renderer had given a release of any claim against
the prospective testator to the latter's son, because at the time the renderer was
under the reasonable impression that she was to receive certain immovable property in the testator's will. The renderer had received a copy of a will, and gave
the release twelve days before the will was actually revoked by the testator.
17. Dauenhauer v. Succession of Browne, 47 La. Ann. 341, 342, 16 So. 827
(1895) ("[There is no attempt by plaintiff] to recover for services to which she
would not have had a right had she insisted upon payment prior to his death.") ;
Succession of Bairdain, 200 So. 661, 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) ("The evidence does not disclose any attempt to recover for services to which she would
not have had a right had she insisted upon payment prior to Mr. Bairdain's death.
She is entitled to her just claim from his succession.").
18. Succession of Francke, 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951) ; Succession of
Williams, 159 La. 814, 106 So. 314 (1925) ; Hansen v. Ahsen, 170 So. 799 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1936); Succession of Crawford, 134 So. 269 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1931) ; Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924).
Failure of proof is of course fatal to the claim. Succession of Larmeau, 142
La. 1050, 78 So. 113 (1918); Succession of Daste, 125 La. 657, 51 So. 677
(1910) ; Adams v. Succession of Mills, 49 La. Ann. 775, 22 So. 257 (189T) ;
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er's household expenses, these disbursements must be set off
against the services rendered. 19 Similarly, if the renderer has
had the use of pension or other payments belonging to the recipient to help defray the expense of caring for the latter, these
must be deducted from the claim of the former for remuneration.20 The services must be such that there could arise an obligation to pay for them ;21 thus, services arising merely out of
friendship 22 or insignificant services such as calling for a priest
or physician 23 are not compensable. If a wife subject to a comEasterling v. Bagwell, 21 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945). However, difficulty
in arriving at a fair evaluation of the services, once they are proved, is not (Succession of Peres, 174 So. 130 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937)), provided the services
can be given a value in money. Cf. notes 77, 183-88 infra, and accompanying
text. However, it appears that it is not alone sufficient that the services are
proved and can be given a monetary value; the court goes further, and examines
the relationship of the parties to ascertain whether recovery should be allowed.
See note 14 supra, and accompanying text. Apparently, the nearer the kinship
or the dearer the friendship the less the chance of recovery. This conclusion is
gleaned by implication of a multitude of opinions. Illustrative are White v. Succession of Candebat, 210 La. 995, 29 So. 2d 39 (1946) ; Succession of Brand, 162
La. 880, 111 So. 267 (1927) ; Succession of Oubre, 109 La. 516, 33 So. 583
(1903) ; Adams v. Succession of Mills, 49 La. Ann. 775, 22 So. 257 (1897) ; Succession of Savant, 132 So. 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931) ; Succession of Burgierres,
12 La. App. 66, 125 So. 320 (1st Cir. 1929) ; Burger v. Larman, 4 Orl. App. 158
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1907). See also the text accompanying notes 21-23 (nature
of the services) and 36-49 (relationship of the parties) infra.
Apparently, the services must be of a more meritorious and significant nature
when the renderer attempts to recover against the estate of the recipient than
when the renderer is attempting to sustain a remunerative or onerous donation
under attack. In the following cases involving a suit against the recipient's
estate without a valid donation the court expressly referred to the very devoted
or onerous nature of the services: Succession of Twohey, 222 La. 697, 63 So. 2d
429 (1953) ; Succession of Francke, 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951) ; Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762 (1941) ; Succession of Burgant, 148
La. 1041, 88 So. 391 (1921) ; Succession of Palmer, 137 La. 190, 68 So. 405
(1915) ; Succession of Alexander, 110 La. 1027, 35 So. 273 (1903) ; Succession
of Stuart, 48 La. Ann. 1484, 21 So. 29 (1896) ; Dauenhauer v. Succession of
Browne, 47 La. Ann. 341, 16 So. 827 (1895) ; Succession of Peres, 174 So. 130
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) ; Succession of Crawford, 134 So. 269 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1931) ; Succession of Burgierres, 12 La. App. 66, 125 So. 320 (1st Cir.
1929) ; Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924) (remunerative donation involved, but held invalid). Compare the nature of the services involved in
these cases with those involved in Succession of Formby, 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d
157 (1962) (remunerative donation upheld).
19. Succession of Francke, 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951) ; Succession of
Arnold, 178 La. 658, 152 So. 322 (1933) ; Succession of Pons, 142 La. 721, 77
So. 515 (1918) ; Succession of Benton, 106 La. 494, 31 So. 123 (1901). Cf. Succession of Stuart, 48 La. Ann. 1484, 21 So. 29 (1896) (claim of renderer not to
be reduced by value of clothing and board furnished her by recipient when former
had rendered services to latter previous to commencement of account sued on).
20. Story v. Story, 131 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
21. Succession of Tito, 188 So. 174 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) (services customarily rendered by hired housekeeper not of sufficient importance or frequency
to allow claim for nursing).
22. Adams v. Succession of Mills, 49 La. Ann. 775, 22 So. 257 (1897). Of.
White v. Succession of Candebat, 210 La. 995, 29 So. 2d 39 (1946) (recovery allowed as no great friendship between renderer and recipient was shown).
23. Succession of Daste, 125 La. 657, 51 So. 677 (1910) ; Succession of Peres,
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munity property regime rendered the services, her husband must
24
sue, as the claim is counted a debt owed the community.
Prescription

Actions for the value of services in the nature of nursing
prescribe in one year.25 As prescription begins to run only upon
accrual of the right in question, 26 it is important to determine

when the right for remuneration of these services accrues. If
the time for payment is left uncertain, prescription begins to
run upon rendition of the services, so that recovery is limited

to services rendered in the twelve months preceding the filing
of suit for their recovery.27 However, if there is an agreement
that payment will be made by the will of the recipient, prescription does not begin to run until the recipient's death, for the
28
renderer could not enforce his claim before then.
174 So. 130 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) ; Succession of Burgierres, 12 La. App. 66,
125 So. 320 (1st Cir. 1929).
24. Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930) ; Succession of Guidry,
40 La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888) ; Story v. Story, 131 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961) ; Succession of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
Of course, if the renderer has transferred his claim to a third party, that person stands in the shoes of the renderer, under the general rule that a transferee's rights can rise no higher than those of his transferor. Succession of
Guidry, 40 La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888).
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3534 (1870) ("The following actions are prescribed by
one year: . . . That of . . . laborers . . . for the payment of their wages.";

nurses are considered as laborers. Vaughn v. Terrell, 23 La. Ann. 62 (1871)) ;
Succession of Bierce, 171 La. 1047, 132 So. 783 (1931); Succession of Fellon,
145 La. 967, 83 So. 208 (1919) ; Succesison of Landry, 120 La. 790, 45 So. 609
(1908) ; Succession of Alexander, 110 La. 1027, 35 So. 273 (1903) ; Succession
of Oubre, 109 La. 516, 33 So. 583 (1903).
Succession of Fellon, supra, had held the language of Article 3534- "innkeepers and such others, on account of lodging and board"-applied to anyone
who furnished board and lodging, and therefore their action also prescribed in
one year. However, Succession of Bierce, supra, expressly overruled Felton on
this point. On the authority of the definition of "innkeepers" contained in
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3232 (1870), Bierce held that "a claim for board or lodging
by one who does not make it a business to keep boarders or lodgers is prescribed
by ten years." 171 La. at 1094, 132 So. at 784. Bierce appears to be the last
expression of the Supreme Court on this question.
26. E.g., Succession of Oliver, 184 La. 26, 165 So. 318 (1936).
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3535 (1870) ; Succession of Burgant, 148 La. 1041,
88 So. 391 (1921) ; Succession of Fellon, 145 La. 967, 83 So. 208 (1919);
Succession of Palmer, 137 La. 190, 68 So. 405 (1915) ; Caldwell v. Turner, 129
La. 19, 55 So. 695 (1911) ; Succession of Alexander, 110 La. 1027, 35 So. 273
(1903) ; Succession of Oubre, 109 La. 516, 33 So. 583 (1903) ; Succession of
Schulte, 1 OrI. App. 70 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1903). But cf. White v. Succession
of Candebat, 210 La. 995, 52 So. 2d 39 (1946) (facts do not show a promise
of remuneration in will of recipient, but prescription held not to begin to run
until death of recipient).
28. Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762 (1941) ; Succession
of Oliver, 184 La. 26, 165 So. 318 (1936) ; Nimmo v. Walker, 14 La. Ann. 581
(1859) ; Succession of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) ; Wall
v. Heslin, 2 Orl. App. 112 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905).
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The Amount of Recovery
Lack of an agreed value of services rendered is not fatal to
a renderer's claim, for recovery can be had on a quantum
30
meruit.29 In the leading case of Succession of Palmer,
it was

held that the renderer is not precluded from a further claim by
a legacy so utterly inadequate that it must be presumed out of
respect to the testator that it was not intended as payment for
the services.3 1 Conversely, if it is not proved with reasonable
certainty that the legacy is insufficient to provide adequate compensation for the services, the renderer is precluded from claiming more from the recipient's estate.8 2 That the renderer is
named in the will of the recipient does not, however, preclude
additional recovery for services performed subsequent to the
confection of the will.33 Likewise, if a specific sum for remuneration has been agreed upon, the renderer may recover the
difference between this sum and that devised him. 34 It has been

held the renderer's claim of remuneration against the recipient's
succession is not affected by a donation inter vivos if the recipient did not intend that the donation stand in payment for the
35
services.
Presumption of Gratuity
Subject to several exceptions, services will not be presumed
29. Succession of Twohey, 222 La. 697, 63 So. 2d 429 (1953) ; Succession of
Francke, 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951); Succession of Gesselly, 216 La.
731, 44 So. 2d 838 (1950) ; White v. Succession of Candebat, 210 La. 995, 29
So. 2d 39 (1946) ; Succession of Joublanc, 199 La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762 (1941);
Succession of Williams, 159 La. 814, 106 So. 314 (1925) ; Story v. Story, 131
So. 2d 913 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App. 663 (1st
Cir. 1927) ; Wall v. Heslin, 2 Orl. App. 112 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905).
30. 137 La. 190, 68 So. 405 (1915).
31. The renderer had performed extremely onerous services for her brother,
a priest whose illness made his "odor . . . as that of dead rats." Id. at 191, 68
So. at 405. The brother had often promised that he would richly reward his
devoted sister in his will for her faithful services. The eventual legacy consisted
of "$100 and an old nongoing iron clock." Id. at 192, 68 So. at 406.
32. Succession of Wilder, 232 La. 905, 95 So. 2d 493 (1957).
33. Delaureal v. Rouget's Succession, 177 La. 815, 149 So. 464 (1933)
Succession of Fellon, 145 La. 967, 83 So. 208 (1919).
34. Succession of Gesselly, 216 La. 731, 44 So. 2d 838 (1950).
35. Succession of Crawford, 134 So. 269 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931). The
recipient had made a donation inter vivos to the renderer of the home in which
the nursing services in question were rendered. The court said: "We also, after
giving it due consideration, believe that it was really a donation by [the recipient],
with no intention on her part of it standing as a payment for the nursing and
care given her by [the renderer]. That she acknowledged she was under obligation to [the renderer] for this is shown by the admission she made to her that
she would pay her after she would get well." Id. at 271. Accord, Succession of
Bairdain, 200 So. 661 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) (Counter letter indicated
transfer was in payment for services rendered before time for which remuneration was claimed and further admitted this payment was inadequate.).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

gratuitous if of an onerous nature. 3 . Dicta in early cases indicated a presumption of gratuity if services were rendered by
one close relative to another, even a collateral ;37 however, this
dicta has been expressly repudiated as to collaterals.38
An early case intimated that the relationship. between parent
and child gave rise to a presumption that compensation had been
40
intended.3 9 However, beginning with Succession of Daste,
36. White v. Succession of Candebat, 210 La. 995, 29 So. 2d 39 (1946);
Succession of Williams, 159 La. 814, 106 So. 314 (1925) ; Succession of Alexander, 110 La. 1027, 35 So. 273 (1903) ; Succession of Guidry, 40 La. Ann.
671, 4 So. 893 (1888) ; Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294 (1871);
Beall v. Bibber, 19 La. Ann. 434 (1867) ; Camfrancq v. Pilie, 1 La. Ann. 197
(1846) ; Succession of Burgierres, 12 La. App. 66, 125 So. 320 (1st Cir. 1929) ;
Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App. 663 (1st Cir. 1927) ; Caraway v. Leblanc, 1
La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924) ; Wall v. Heslin, 2 Orl. App. 112 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1905).
In Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 295 (1871), the court intimated
that concubinage would not bar recovery for services rendered during the illicit
relationship unless it was "alleged and proved to have been the motive and cause
of the parties living together in the same house in the first instance, and the
services in question to have been merely incidental to such a state of living ....
An employer can not pay off a female employee by robbing her of her virtue.
Such a method of extinguishing an obligation is not known to the law."
For further discussion of the nature of the services and its effect on recovery,
see text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
37. Succession of Templeman, 134 La. 798, 64 So. 718 (1914); Succession
of Daste, 125 La. 657, 51 So. 677 (1910) ; Succession of Oubre, 109 La. 516,
33 So. 583 (1903) (by implication).
38. Succession of Dugas, 215 La. 13, 39 So. 2d 750 (1949), reversing 33
So. 2d 133 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). This holding was approved in a strong
dictum in Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 40 So. 2d 21 (1949), reversing 33 So. 2d
128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). It is interesting to note that the main basis for
the holding Dugas was overruled in Muse. Yet, as indicated above, Muse approved the Dugas holding. After noting that services rendered between parent
and child are presumed gratuitous particularly when the parent is in necessitous
circumstances, the court in Dugas held that the presumption of gratuity did not
apply between brothers and sisters because the law does not impose an obligation
of support between collaterals. Yet, Muse held that not only was the obligation
of support between parent and child (when one is in penurious circumstances)
not the basis of the presumption of gratuity, but such obligation made the presumption completely immaterial; since the law imposes the obligation on the
children, they may not recover compensation for their services rendered pursuant
thereto, and resort to the presumption of gratuity is superfluous. (See the text
accompanying notes 44-49 infra for further discussion of the Muse case.)
It
might seem that the status of the rule as to collaterals is doubtful in view of
the foregoing. However, Dugas also noted that this lack of a presumption of
gratuity is "in accord with the general law on the subject," citing certain common law authorities. 215 La. at 21, 39 So. 2d at 752. Moreover, Muse noted in
dictum that "there is no reason to presume that such services are administered
solely for reasons of love and affection and are, therefore, gratuitous" where
collaterals are involved, 215 La. at 243, 40 So. 2d at 23, n. 2. Considering the
composition of the court at the time of rendition of the Dugas and Muse opinions
and that at present, and the emphatic dictum in Muse, it is probable that the
presumption will be held to be inapplicable with reference to collaterals if the
matter arises again.
39. Estate of Olivier, 18 La. Ann. 594 (1866).
The claim of the renderer
(the son of the deceased) was allowed on rather meager evidence, "considering
the relations which must naturally exist between a mother and son." Id. at 595.
40. 125 La. 657, 51 So. 677 (1910). The Daste case appears to be the first
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there has been an unbroken line of Supreme Court cases holding
that services in the nature of nursing and care voluntarily rendered by a child4 to a parent are presumed gratuitous. 42 Conexpressly holding that there is a presumption of gratuity when services are
rendered about the house to a parent by a child. One of the Louisiana cases
cited in support of the proposition - Succession of Ploton, 36 La. Ann. 211
(1884) - dealt with the services of a steamboat agent, and the other - Succession of Fink, 13 La. Ann. 103 (1858) - concerned a general business agent.
The only authorities cited in support of the specific proposition advanced were
common law ones. Although not mentioned in Daste, Succession of Guidry, 40
La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888), has been cited as standing for the presumption
of gratuity. However, nowhere in the opinion of Guidry is there any mention
of a presumption of gratuity; the opinion is based exclusively on LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 229 (1870) that provides children are bound to maintain their parents when
in need. The tenor of the opinion is exemplified in the following quotation: "The
fulfillment of that obligation [imposed by Article 229] does not transform the
child into a creditor capable of claiming reimbursement in any contingency. He
has paid a debt imposed upon him by law, and simply remains in the condition
of a debtor who has discharged an obligation." 40 La. Ann. at 673, 4 So. at 895.
Thus, it may safely be said that the Daste case is the fountainhead of the presumption of gratuity. Further discussion of the obligation to support a parent
in penurious circumstances may be found in the text accompanying notes 44-49
infra. Parenthetically, it might be added that the Guidry case appears to be the
strongest jurisprudential authority for the Muse case.
41. Notwithstanding an early holding that a step or foster child did not fall
within the presumption of gratuity - Succession of Stuart, 48 La. Ann. 1484,
21 So. 29 (1896) -at
least three later cases have held otherwise. Succession
of Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267 (1927) ; Succession of Daste, 125 La. 657,
51 So. 677 (1910) ; Succession of Savant, 132 So. 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931).
However, a son-in-law or daughter-in-law is not considered a child for purposes
of the presumption. Succession of McKnight, 129 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961).
42. Succession of Francke, 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951) ; Muse v. Muse,
215 La. 238, 40 So. 2d 21 (1949) ; Succession of Dugas, 215 La. 13, 39 So. 2d
750 (1949) (dictum) ; Succession of Roque, 176 La. 711, 146 So. 477 (1933) ;
Farrar v. Johnson, 172 La. 30, 133 So. 352 (1931) ; Succession of Brand, 162
La. 880, 111 So. 267 (1927) ; Succession of Pons, 142 La. 721, 77 So. 515
(1918) ; Succession of Templeman, 134 La. 798, 64 So. 718 (1914). Courts of
appeal cases so holding include Story v. Story, 131 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961) ; Succession of McKnight, 129 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)
(dictum); Succession of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945)
(dictum) ; Succession of Savant, 132 So. 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931) ; Caraway
v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924).
A statement in Kiper v. Kiper, 214 La. 733, 743, 38 So. 2d 507, 510 (1948),
intimated that the presumption of gratuity applied only where there was a
single child. "From a review of the jurisprudence [no cases cited] of this State,
it appears that the presumption arises that services rendered to a parent by a
child are gratuitous if he be the only child, but the jurisprudence seems to be
conflicting as to whether this presumption arises if there be more than one child."
However, the statement was dictum, as the court then promptly and properly
pointed out that "however that may be, where there is an expressed intention
shown to compensate a child for the services rendered the presumption of gratuity
does not arise." Ibid. Although no case was found which actually decided the
point, the proposition was reiterated, again in dictum, in Placid Oil Co. v.
Frazier, 126 So. 2d 800, 803 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). It is respectfully submitted that there is no distinction to be made as regards the applicability vel non
of the presumption on the ground of the number of children. The distinction
properly to be made depends rather on the pecuniary circumstances of the parent,
as properly pointed out in Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 40 So. 2d 21 (1949). See
text accompanying and following note 44 infra. This confusion in the Kiper case
was probably prompted by the distinct situation involved when one child who
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sequently, the child is now allowed recovery for such services
only if there is an express or implied contract for remuneration,
or an otherwise clear intention rebutting the presumption is
shown.

43

The First Circuit Court of Appeal attempted to limit the
presumption of gratuity to cases in which the parent was in
need ;44 the court reasoned that the presumption results only
from Civil Code Article 229, which obliges a child to support
his parent in necessitous circumstances. 45 Consequently, where
has cared for a parent in necessitous circumstances seeks contribution from the
other children as co-obligors.
(This point is discussed in detail in the text
accompanying and following note 50 infra.) As noted above, the court in Kiper
merely referred to a "review of the jurisprudence" without mentioning any specific cases. Perhaps the court had reference to the case of Succession of Guidry,
40 La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888), discussed in note 40 supra. In that case
the court, in denying recovery for services rendered by the child of the deceased,
said in dictum: "The case would be different if, instead of being the only child,
the son had had brothers or sisters.
...Id. at 673, 4 So. at 895. At this point
the Guidry case might appear as support for the only-child distinction suggested
in Kiper. But, the court continued in the same sentence, "for in that case (when
there is more than one child], as each and all would have been bound to provide
entirely, as it were in 8olido, for the wants and necessities of the mother, the
child performing his obligation could have had recourse again8t the other issue
for contribution." Ibid. Thus, the court was merely trying to point out that
the question of contribution is affected by the number of children. Obviously, if
there is only one child, there is no one against whom the child can recover contribution, as there is no co-obligor. As pointed out in note 40 supra, the Guidry
case did not expressly deal with the presumption of gratuity; only by reading
the first part of the sentence quoted supra out of context could a distinction in
reference to the presumption be gleaned by implication from the Guidry case. It
is submitted that the dictum expressions in the Kiper and Placid Oil cases, supra,
should be disregarded.
43. See cases cited in the first paragraph of note 42 supra. An example of an
otherwise clear intent to the contrary is illustrated by a strong dictum in Vercher
v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930), in which a parent executed what
purported to be a last will and testament before a notary, bequeathing all his
property to his daughter in remuneration for her having cared for him. The
will was abortive in that it was "virtually devoid of every essential of a will."
Id. at 526, 131 So. at 659. The court said that the will nevertheless indicated
"the decedent evidently intended to reward his daughter for the services she had
performed." Ibid. Another example is seen in Succession of Francke, 219 La.
288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951).
The following statement by the recipient mother
to her attorney was held sufficient to indicate an intention to compenstate:
" 'Sister [the renderer daughter] should be compensated for all the services she
rendered to me.' 'Be sure and pay her for her services'." Id. at 296, 52 So. 2d
at 858. See also Succession of Berthelot, 24 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945)
(renderer paid in part by recipient prior to latter's death; also, recipient had
paid other daughters for similar services) ; Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192
(1st Cir. 1924) (donation inter vivos to remunerate for services, although void
as a donation, is evidence of intention to compensate).
It should be noted that where the parent makes a remunerative donation
to the child the presumption of gratuity is obviously negated. This is discussed

in detail in the text accompanying notes
44. Muse v. Muse, 33 So. 2d 128 (La.
23 Tiu. L. REV. 292 (1948).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 229 (1870) :
father and mother and other ascendants,

170-72 infra.
App. 1st Cir. 1947), approved in Note,
"Children are bound to maintain their
who are in need; and the relatives in
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the parent was not in need, there was no reason to presume the
child rendered the services gratuitously. This holding was reversed by the Supreme Court case of Muse v. Muse4" because the
lower appellate court's ruling was "predicated on [an] inconsistent theory. '47 The Supreme Court noted that if the parent
is in penurious circumstances there is no possibiilty of the
child's recovering against the parent's estate; the services rendered by the child in compliance with Article 229 could not be
charged as a debt of the parent's succession inasmuch as the
child is merely fulfilling his legal obligation in rendering the
services.4 8 It is only when the parent is not in need, so that
Article 229 imposes no obligation on the child to support the
parent, that the presumption of gratuity arises. If there should
ever be a presumption of gratuity when a child renders services
to his parent,49 the Supreme Court's position seems sound; its
rejection of the First Circuit's rationale certainly seems correct.
Contribution.- In at least three cases, the Supreme Court
has stated in dictum that a child who has cared for a parent in
penurious circumstances has a cause of action against all other
children individually for contribution to the extent of their
the direct ascending line are likewise bound to maintain their needy descendants,
this obligation being reciprocal ....

46. 215 La. 238, 40 So. 2d 21 (1949).
47. Id. at 241, 40 So. 2d at 22.
48. See the quotations from the Guidry case, note 40 supra.
49. The doctrine appears to be too well entrenched to be evicted without
very compelling reasons. None occur to the writer. It could be argued that
today's family unit is not so close knit as that of yesteryear - see, e.g., Cavers,
Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 IOWA L. REv. 203
(1935) - and thus when a child renders personal services to his parent he intends
to receive compensation therefor. The short answer to this is that the presumption of gratuity is just that -a
rebuttable presumption; and if the child desires
compensation he simply need so agree with his parent. It is submitted that the
presumption is justified; by the very nature of their relationship it seems that
when a child renders care and attention to the wants of his parent there is no
intention to charge for these services unless there is an agreement for compensation. In fact, it might be asked whether the presumption should extend to close
collaterals. As was said by Judge Estopinal in Burger v. Larman, 4 Orl. App.
158, 160-61 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1907): "[W]e do not think that it ever occurred
to plaintiff's mind while he cared for and watched over his mother's uncle [likened
unto plaintiff's foster grandfather by the court], that he 'would after the latter's
death claim compensation for his services. . . . [P]laintiff's services were valuable
but considering his relationship to the deceased . . . we are constrained to conclude that he did no more nor less than he was in conscience and duty bound
to do and it is regrettable that the hasty action resulting in this proceeding should
now stand a bar to the sweet satisfaction which should have been plaintiff's. ...
"...*Plaintiff and the person nearer and dearer to him in all the world,
his mother, were the recipients of [the deceased's] love, kindness and favor and
plaintiff was but paying the debt in kind when he voluntarily hastened to the
old man's bedside and endeavored to give him hope and comfort during his last
days."
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virile shares, on the rationale that the obligation of support
placed by Article 229 is one in solido on all the children.5 0 But
it has been emphasized that the child rendering the services has
no claim against the succession of an indigent parent.5 ' Conversely, if the parent is not in need, no child is obliged to sup-

port him, and a child rendering services cannot claim contribution from the other children regardless of whether there is a
contract, express or implied, of support. 52 However, in this
event the renderer may have a claim against his parent's
53

estate.

REMUNERATIVE AND ONEROUS DONATIONS
54
AND THEIR ROLE IN THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS

Moral, Natural, and Civil Obligations
The Code declares that there are three kinds of obligations:
moral or imperfect, natural, and civil or perfect.5 5 The moral
or imperfect obligation operates only in the moral sense, and
has no legal operation.5 6 A natural obligation, though binding

on the obligor "in conscience and according to natural justice,"
cannot be enforced.5 7 Nevertheless, it has legal operation in
that what has been given in compliance with a natural obliga-

tion cannot be recovered. 58 Moreover, it is "sufficient considera50. Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 241, 40 So. 2d 21, 23 (1949) ; Succession of
Templeman, 134 La. 798, 64 So. 718 (1914) ; Succession of Guidry, 40 La. Ann.
671, 4 So. 893 (1888). Though no case has been found in point, it could be
argued on the basis of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 231 (1870) that the obligation of
support is not solidary: "Alimony shall be granted in proportion to the wants
of the person requiring it, and the circumstances of those who are to pay it."
(Emphasis added.) From this it might be inferred that less wealthy children
are not so obligated monetarily as the wealthier, and each owes support or alimony
according to his means. The question might still be considered open, as no case
was found which actually held that the child who rendered the services to the
indigent parent could recover contribution to the extent of the virile shares of
the other children.
51. Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 242, 40 So. 2d 21, 23 (1949).
52. Ibid.
53. See the cases cited note 43 supra.
54. The discussion which follows as to cause, onerous and remunerative donations, and moral and natural obligations is based largely on Smith, A Refresher
Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV. 2, 15-19 (1951).
Another relevant transaction is the dation en paiement or giving in payment,
a species of the onerous contract of sale. Instead of the debtor's giving a "price
in current money" to his creditor, he gives, in payment for a sum due, a thing.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2655 (1870). Cf. id. art. 2439. This is further discussed in
note 200 infra.
55. LIA. Civii. CoDE art. 1757 (1870).
56. Id. art. 1757(t).
57. Id. art. 1757(2).
58. Id. art. 1759(1).
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tion" for a new contract,59 and therefore may give rise to a civil
obligation. The civil or perfect obligation may arise from the
conventional agreement known as contract, and is legally enforceable 60
One might justly expect that the rendition of services without a view to remuneration would at least give rise to a natural
obligation in the recipient to compensate for them. But the Code
declares "natural obligations are of four kinds," and lists the
four without mention of prior services."1 It has been expressly
held that this listing is exclusive.6 2 Moreover, the Code gives
as an example of a merely moral obligation "the duty of exercis'63
ing gratitude.
Gratuitous and Onerous Contracts
It might appear that a party rendering services in circumstances that give rise to no right in contract or quasi-contract is
remediless to recover even if the recipient later promises to
compensate him for his services, since a moral or imperfect
obligation to compensate is not "sufficient consideration" to support a new contract. However, the Code divides contracts into
two types based upon the motive for making them. 64 The object of a gratuitous contract is to benefit the obligee without a
59. Id. art. 1759(2).
60. Id. arts. 1757(3), 1760(2). Civil obligations may also originate by operation of law. Id. art. 1760(1). These types of civil obligations are treated in

Title V, "Of Quasi Contracts, And Of Offenses and Quasi Offenses" of the
Louisiana Civil Code.

61. Id. art. 1758.
62. Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 110 La. 651, 34
So. 723 (1903). Accord, Succession of Burns, 199 La. 1081, 7 So. 2d 359 (1942).
Contra, In re Atkins Estate, 30 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1929). However, without
mention of the exclusiveness vel non of Article 1758, the courts have allowed

"obligations" not mentioned in that article to support a new and binding contract. E.g., Breaux v. Breaux, 218 La. 795, 51 So. 2d 73 (1951). (fidei commissumr declared to create at least a natural obligation); Blanc v. Banks, 10

Rob. 115 (La. 1845) (new promise to pay debt discharged in bankruptcy may be
enforced; court did not mention natural obligations) ; Cook v. City of Shreveport,

144 So. 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) (payment of illegal tax not recoverable;
natural obligation on owner-taxpayer to pay improperly recorded paving lien).
The cases, and natural obligations in general, are discussed in Comment, 12 LA.
L. REV. 79 (1951) ; Note 7 LA. L. REV. 445 (1947). At other times the courts
have used the terms "moral obligation" and "natural obligation" interchangeably.
E.g., White v. White, 7 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). It appears the
redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 intended the listing to be exclusive, and were
very careful to distinguish between natural and moral obligations. I LOUISIANA
LEGAL ARCHIVES,

PROJET OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF

1825, 226 (1937).

But see note 77 infra for an argument that Article 1758 is not exclusive.
63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1757(1) (1870).

64. Id. art. 1772.
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corresponding benefit to the obligor ;65 as its name implies, the
obligor is engaged in giving. An onerous contract arises when
the obligor receives a thing or promise in return for his obligation ;s6 it involves roughly the exchange of equivalents, and the
obligor is not giving, but paying.
Donations: Pure, Onerous, and Remunerative
Although there are others, 67 the principal gratuitous contract
is the donation. 6s Donations proceed from a spirit of liberality
emanating from the donor to the donee. They are divided, according to the time at which they are made, into donations inter
vivos and donations mortis causa, the former "between living
persons," and the latter "in prospect of death."6 9 Donations are
also categorized, according to the donor's cause or motive in
making them, into three further classes: the gratuitous donation, made from a pure spirit of liberality without conditions;
the onerous donation, in which the donee is burdened with
charges imposed by the donor; and the remunerative donation,
the object of which is to compensate for services previously
rendered. 70
Because a donation depletes the donor's patrimony, it must
conform to certain rules of form and substance not imposed upon
other contracts. Among these are the requirement of authentic
form, 71 the inability of the donor to reserve to himself the usufruct of donated immovable property, 72 the incapacity of the
donor to divest himself of so much of his property that he does
not reserve enough for his subsistence, 73 and the prohibition
74
against a donation's exceeding the disposable portion.
65. Id. art. 1773.
66. Id. art. 1774.
67. Id. art. 2991 (mandate), art. 2894 (loan for use), art. 2929 (deposit),
art. 3035 (nonremunerative suretyship).
68. Id. art. 1467.
69. Id. arts. 1468, 1469.
70. Id. art. 1523.
The nature of the transaction, and not the title given the act by the parties,
determines whether a donation is onerous or remunerative. Thus, where the
donor referred to the donation as onerous, but intended it to compensate for
services rendered, the court treated the donation as remunerative. Succession of
Formby, 127 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 243 La.
120, 142 So.2d 157 (1962).
71. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1536, 1538 (1870).
72. Id. art. 1533.
73. Id. art. 1497.
74. Id. arts. 1493-1518.
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Article 1526 and its Role in Contract Characterization
In certain cases transfers made to compensate for services
rendered or to be rendered are relieved of conformance with the
exacting formal and substantive requirements pertaining to
donations. The Code provides that the onerous donation is not
a real donation "if the value of the object given does not manifestly exceed that of the charges imposed on the donee" ;75 nor
is the remunerative donation a real donation if the value of the
services rendered is little inferior to the value of the thing
'' 7 7
given,7 6 provided the services may be "appreciated in money.
75. Id. art. 1524: "The onerous donation is not a real donation, if the value
of the object given does not manifestly exceed that of the charges imposed on
the donee."
76. Id. art. 1525: "The remunerative donation is not a real donation, if the
value of the services to be recompensed thereby being appreciated in money, should
be little inferior to that of the gift."
77. Ibid. This requirement (apparently borrowed from the French jurisprudence and commentators; see the last paragraph of note 78 inIra) serves to
differentiate those services which are so insubstantial that they could not give
rise to a debt in any respect from those services which will support a remunerative donation. Thus, if a monetary value cannot be given the services, they will
not support a remunerative donation; any donation given to "recompense" therefor must arise out of mere gratitude, i.e., the transaction is a pure donation. The
courts have made limited use of this requirement (see notes 184-88 infra),
usually mentioning it only in passing, with no attempt to define what services
can or cannot be measured in money. The requirement that the services be
appreciable in money seems less rigidly enforced against onerous or remunerative
donations than against contractual or quasi-contractual claims against the recipient's estate. See note 18 8upra. Apparently the courts feel that if the donor
saw fit to donate money or valuable property to compensate for the services,
they were appreciable in money so far as the donor was concerned, and his wishes
should be respected.
The "appreciable in money" requirement might also be useful in determining
whether a natural obligation arises when one renders services to another. It might
be argued that the listing of natural obligations in Article 1758 is not exclusive
by reading Articles 1525, 1526, 1757, 1758, and 1759 in pari materia. It seems
clear that one should not restrict the application of the principles of remunerative donations embodied in Articles 1525 and 1526 to cases in which a duty to
pay would never arise. Otherwise, there would arise the following anomalous
situation: If the services were rendered under circumstances such that a duty
to pay would arise, were appreciable in money to the extent of $500, and the
value of the thing given were $749, the "donation" would be reduced to $500;
:but if the services were not such as to give rise to an obligation to pay, and the
same monetary figures were involved, under Article 1526 the donation would
stand for the full sum of $749. (See text accompanying notes 162-69 infra for
further discussion of the question of reduction under Article 1513, and when it
is applicable.) The redactors of the Civil Code surely did not intend such a
result. It is suggested the moral obligation described in Article 1757(1) comprehends only those situations in which the services rendered cannot be appreciated in money. If this is so, then in those situations in which the services can
be so appreciated, they must give rise to a civil or natural obligation of at least
a limited kind. Remembering that Article 1759 provides that (1) whatever has
been given in compliance with a natural obligation cannot be recovered, and (2)
a. natural obligation is sufficient "consideration" for a new contract, consider
the following hypothetical situation: Suppose A has rendered services to B
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Thus, the legislature has determined that onerous and remunerative donations in certain cases partake more of the nature of
onerous contracts than of donations. Specifically, Article 1526
provides that unless the value of the thing given exceeds by onehalf the value of the charges imposed in an onerous donation or
the services rendered in a remunerative donation, the rules
7
peculiar to donations do not apply. 8
without a formal contract, and a monetary value can be placed upon the services.
Suppose further the circumstances are such that a civil obligation to pay for the
services will not be implied, i.e., there is no contractual or quasi-contractual duty
in B to pay. If B subsequently promised to pay A for the services, it is doubtful
this promise would be enforceable against B under Article 1759(2). Yet, it
seems certain that if B transferred to A property substantially equal in value
to that of the services the transfer would be counted a remunerative donation,
and B could not recover the property. Consequently, this situation seems to fit
the function of a natural obligation described in Article 1759(1). Thus, Article
1758, as written, cannot stand under this theory. The obligation of B to A was
not a mere moral one, since the services were appreciable in money, and by
hypothesis neither was the obligation a civil one. Consequently, it must have
been a natural obligation. It is submitted that if Article 1757(1) were restricted
to cases where no monetary value could be placed on the services, and if Article
1758 were not considered completely exclusive, these articles could be squared
with results obtained under Article 1526. That is, the rendition of services
appreciable in money creates a natural obligation to the extent that whatever
has been given in recognition thereof cannot be recovered.
78. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1526 (1870) : "In consequence, the rules peculiar to
donations inter vivos do not apply to onerous and remunerative donations, except
when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the charges or of
the services." Note that the article actually reads "rules peculiar to donations
inter vivos," rather than "rules peculiar to donations." Throughout this Comment the article will be treated as if it read the latter way but with certain
restrictions. This is discussed later in the Comment. See note 159 (2d ) infra.
Throughout this Comment the phrases "meet the test of Article 1526,....
the
test of Article 1526 is met," etc., will be used for brevity. When they are used,
it is meant that the value of the thing given does not exceed by one-half the value
of the services rendered, and therefore the rules peculiar to donations do not
apply in the situation under consideration. Conversely, when it is said that a
transaction "runs afoul of Article 1526," "does not meet the test of Article 1526,"
etc., it is meant that the rules peculiar to donations do apply.
The correct mathematical meaning of Article 1526 has been a constant source
of confusion in the jurisprudence. The article clearly states that the rules
peculiar to donations apply only when the value of the thing given e.xceeds by
one-half the value of the charge or service, i.e., the former is at least one and
one-half times greater than the latter. Another, and perhaps clearer, statement
of this rule is that the rules peculiar to donations do not apply if the value of
the charges imposed or the services rendered exceeds two-thirds of the value of
the thing given. The opinion in Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633
(1944) several times states the rule in this manner. E.g., "the services rendered
by the donee in this instance . . . greatly exceeded two-thirds of the value of
the property donated; which is the same as to say that the value of the property
donated did not amount to one and one-half times the value of the services
rendered by the donee." Id. at 22, 18 So. 2d at 640. The Whitman case is
probably the clearest jurisprudential example of the correct application of Article
1526. Other cases correctly stating the rule of the article include In re Andrus,
221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952) ; Bowlus v. Whatley, 129 La. 509, 56 So. 423
(1911) (not a case of personal service rendered about the home) ; Pulford v. Dimmick, 107 La. 403, 31 So. 879 (1902) (same) ; Placid Oil Co. v. Frazier, 126
So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1942) ; Robinson v. Guedry, 181 So. 882 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938);
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ONEROUS DONATIONS

MADE SUBJECT

TO A CHARGE OF SUPPORT IN THE DONEE

Article 1497 (Donations Omnium Bonorum) and
Its Effect on Onerous Donations
Civil Code Article 1497 prohibits a donation omnium bonorum: one cannot by donation inter vivos79 divest himself of so
much of his property that he does not reserve to himself enough
for his subsistence. ° The purpose of this "prohibitory law,
Steen v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 39 (2d Cir. 1925). Frequent
misstatements of the rule are that the value of the services rendered or charges
imposed must exceed one-half the value of the object given for the rules peculiar
to donations to be inapplicable; and that the rules peculiar to donations will be
applied if the value of the thing given is double that of the services or charges.
E.g., Castleman v. Smith, 148 La. 233, 86 So. 778 (1920) ; Latour v. Guillory,
130 La. 570, 58 So. 341 (1912) ; Succession of Dopler v. Feigle, 40 La. Ann. 848,
6 So. 106 (1888) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845) ; Bordelon v.
Brown, 84 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Lemoine v. Lemoine, 27 So. 2d
650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ; Lafield v. Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1945). That in all these cases the court, immediately prior or subsequent to
its incorrect statement of the rule, either quoted or paraphrased Article 1526 indicates failure to realize there was any difference between the rule as misstated
by the court and as laid down by Article 1526. The difference is easily illustrated.
Assume that the value of the thing given is $9,000. If the article is correctly
interpreted, the value of the services appreciated in money (pretermitting fractions of dollars) would have to be at least $6,001 in order that the rules peculiar
to donations would not apply; whereas, under the usual incorrect interpretation
the services would only have to be valued at $4,501. Although the case was
decided correctly on other grounds, Moore v. Sucher, 234 La. 1068, 102 So. 2d
459 (1958), illustrates a situation where this different result would follow. The
Moore case is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1957-1958 Term - Sales, 19 LA. L. REV. 319, 322 (1959).
One case even stated the rule to be that the rules peculiar to donations are
applicable only if the value of the thing given exceeds one-half of the value of the
services. Succession of Spann, 169 La. 412, 417, 125 So. 289, 291 (1929). Fortunately, this seems to be the only instance of such an interpretation of Article
1526.
The French have no articles corresponding to LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1523-1526
(1870), and, are not bound by such automatic restrictions. However, the result
reached is substantially the same, the French using the theory of cause coupled
with an expanded concept of natural obligations to distinguish donations from
onerous contracts. If the services to be recompensed, valued in money, fairly
correspond to the value of the thing given, the French determine that the giver
was not moved by a spirit of liberality but by a duty of conscience; his cause
is not to give but to pay. Consequently the transaction is not treated as a donation but as an onerous contract. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA.
L. REV. 2, 18 (1951). A discussion and review of the French and German jurisprudence in this area may be found in Schiller, The Counterpart of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, in REPORT OF THE NEW YORK (STATE) LAW
REvisIoN CoMMIssIoN

:

187, 209-12

(1936).

79. Ackerman v. Larner, 116 La. 101, 40 So. 581 (1906) applied Article 1497

to manual gifts (LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1539 (1870)).
. 80. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1497 (1870)
"The donation inter vivos shall in no

case divest the donor of all his property; he must reserve to himself enough for
subsistence; if he does not do it, the donation is null for the whole." See Comment, 6 LA. L. REv. 98 (1944) for a general discussion of donations omnium
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enacted in the interest of good morals and public order" 81 is
obvious: paupers burden society. In such case the donation is
absolutely null8 2 and is neither capable of ratification 3 nor cured
by prescription.8 4 This nullity strikes the whole of a donation
omnium bonorum, not merely that portion which exceeds an
amount adequate for the donor's subsistence. s 5 Albeit apparently inconsistent with the rule that a donation omnium bonorum
is void and not voidable,8 6 it has been held that a third party
purchasing from the donee in reliance on the faith of the public
records will be protected if the transaction does not purport on
its face to be a donation.8 7
bonorum. Considerable textual consideration is given the donation omnium
bonorum because it is the usual ground upon which an onerous donation subject
to a charge of support is attacked.

81. Welch v. Forest Lumber Co., 151 La. 960, 963, 92 So. 400, 401 (1922).
82. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1497 (1870) ; Litton v. Stephens, 187 La. 918, 175

So. 619 (1937) (onerous donation) ; Welch v. Forest Lumber Co., 151 La. 960,
92 So. 400 (1922) (same) ; Harris v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904)
(same) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845) (same). As to remunerative donations, compare Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924)
(Article 1497 invoked to annual donation) with Tucker v. Angell, 1 La. App. 577
(2d Cir. 1925) (Article 1497 not applied; cases involving onerous donations
distinguished).
83. E.g., Welch v. Forest Lumber Co., 151 La. 960, 92 So. 400 (1922) ; Cox
v. Busch-Everett Oil Co., 131 La. 817, 60 So. 256 (1912) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8
So. 2d 787 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). Nor can the donor be estopped to assert
the invalidity of the donation omnium bonorum. Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024,
60 So. 671 (1913) ; Cox v. Busch-Everett Oil Co., supra (dictum) ; Ackerman
v. Larner, 116 La. 101, 40 So. 581 (1906) ; Hearon v. Davis, supra.
84. Litton v. Stephens, 187 La. 918, 175 So. 619 (1937) ; Kirby v. Kirby,
176 La. 1037, 147 So. 70 (1933) ; Welch v. Forest Lumber Co., 151 La. 960, 92
So. 400 (1922) ; Ackerman v. Larner, 116 La. 101, 40 So. 581 (1906) ; Lagrange
v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845). The prescription most often pleaded is that
of five years relative to the rescission of contracts and other acts. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 3542 (1870). The suit to annul a donation omnium bonorum is not to be
analogized, on the ground that the heirs are creditors, to the revocatory action;
thus it is not prescribed by one year under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1994 (1870).
Welch v. Forest Lumber Co., 8upra.
85. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1497 (1870) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La.
1845) (donation omnium bonorum not reducible).
86. Another inconsistency discussed in Comment, 6 LA. L. REV. 98 (1944)
is that "it is definitely settled that the collateral heirs have no right to annual
a donation omnium l)onorum, either during the life of the donor or after his
death." Id. at 100. The Comment also criticizes the holdings that forced heirs
may invoke Article 1.497 after the death of the donor, but not during his life.
It is pointed out that after the donor's death the reason for the rule of the
article has expired, i.e., the impoverished donor is no longer a charge upon
society. Further, the forced heirs, under LA. CIVI. CODE art. 229 (1870), are
the very ones who will have to support the penurious donor, and thus they have
an interest in annulling the donation omnium bonorum during his life. It is also
suggested therein that if the state is called upon to support the donor it should
have the right to invoke Article 1497.
87. Prater v. Porter, 176 La. 324, 331, 145 So. 675, 676 (1933) (rule only
applies where "the litigants . . . [are] the original parties to the contracts
attacked") ; Rocques v. Freeman, 125 La. 60, 51 So. 68 (1910) ; Steen v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1925) ("The transfer, in
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I To invalidate a donation under Article 1497, the party attacking it has the burden of proving the donor has not retained
enough for his subsistence."" Although no categorical statement
can be made as to what is "enough for subsistence,"8 9 the following reservations have been held insufficient for the donor's
subsistence: a small government pension ;90 almost as much land
question not being on its face a donation but a sale, and [the third party purchaser] having acted on the faith of its being a sale, plaintiffs' [apparently heirs
of the donor] claim against that company must fail whatever be the truth as
to: the value of the land in 1902 and the amount paid by [the donee] therefor.") ;
Tucker v. Angell, 1 La. App. 577 (2d Cir. 1925) (dictum). But cf. the remedy
provided the donor under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1568 (1870) if the donation is
revoked or rescinded for non-execution of a condition.
The exception in favor of third parties relying on the public records apparently
does not apply where the transaction is on its face a donation. Litton v. Stephens,
187 La. 918, 924, 175 So. 619, 621 (1937) ("The donation in this case being
void ab initio, the donee acquired no title, and the sale by the donee to her codefendant . . . conveyed no title."). It has also been held inapplicable where the
cash consideration recited in the deed is so insignificant that the third party
purchaser must have known that the true consideration was the obligation to
support, also recited in the deed. Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787, 792 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1942) ("Anyone examining the public records and reading the instrument with a view of purchasing the property [worth $800] . . . would unquestionably have decided that its real and true consideration was not the $25
[previously referred to by the court as a "mere bagatelle"] but the onerous condition incorporated therein; and this being true, the character of the act as a
donation should have been apparent.").
.-a88. Potts v. Potts, 152 La. 906, 77 So. 786 (1918) ; Hearsey v. Craig, 126
La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910) ; Bourgeat v. Dumoulin, 12 La. Ann. 204 (1857);
Welch v. Courville, 99 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) ; Nunge v. Cegretto,
3 Orl. App. 39 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905).
89. Exactly what is sufficient for "subsistence" is a question of fact. Bourgeat
v. Dumoulin, 12 La. Ann. 204 (1857) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1942). The courts generally do not elaborate the criteria used for deciding this question, but simply state the conclusion that an insufficient reservation for subsistence has or has not been shown. E.g., Welch v. Forest Lumber
Co., 151 La. 960, 92 So. 400 (1922) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845)
(no mention that donor had not reserved movable property sufficient for subsistence) ; Hearon v. Davis, supra. But cf. Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53
So. 17 (1910) (court went into detailed discussion and examination of testimony
to determine if donor had reserved enough for subsistence).
Ducote v. Stark, 87 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) contains what is probably the best discussion of "subsistence," and points out the lack of a definitive
guide.
In Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944), certain children
transferred property to their brother in the form of an onerous donation, the
charge being to support the parties' mother. In answer to the donors' contention
that they had divested themselves of all their property the court observed that
Article 1497 requires only reservation of "enough for subsistence." Consequently,
since all of the donors either had a decent job or were married and amply supported by their husbands, the court doubted that their transfers came within the
spirit of Article 1497; they were not left destitute by the transfer of the property. Especially was that so, reasoned the court, since the property transferred
had virtually no sale value and produced no revenue, so that its transfer divested
the donors of no source of revenue. The language might be considered dictum,
since the court had previously found that the transfer was an onerous donation
not subject to the rules peculiar to donations. See notes 14042 infra, and accompanying text, for further discussion of the Whitman case.
90. Balzrette v. Hughes, 232 La. 509, 94 So. 2d 649 (1957) (by implication)
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as was donated, where the land reserved produced little or no
revenue ;91 and mineral rights in the land donated, but of small
value at the time of donation.9 2 However, if the act of donation
imposes on the donee, in addition to the charge of care and support, an annuity for life sufficient to maintain the donor in the
93
style to which he is accustomed, the donation may be upheld.
It is well settled that the subjection of a donation otherwise
omnium bonorum to the charge or condition that the donee will
thereafter maintain and support the donor is not a reservation
of "enough for subsistence" under Article 1497. 9 4 That the
donee has fulfilled the charge of support is generally immaterial,
for the nullity of the donation is not dependent upon a violation
of the condition.
Because the donation is null, the donee is entitled to recover from the donor any expenses he has incurred
in fulfilling the charge of support.9 6
One early case required tender to the donee of his expenses
as a condition precedent to the bringing of the action under ArWeems v. Medak, 231 La. 923, 93 So. 2d 217 (1957) ; Ducote v. Stark, 87 So. 2d
770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942).
91. Litton v. Stephens, 187 La. 918, 175 So. 619 (1937) (80 acres donated;
57 1/2 acres reserved) ; Ducote v. Stark, 87 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956)
(17 or 18 acres reserved; evaluated at $1,400) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (20 acres and a few head of stock provided only meager
revenue).
92. Weems v. Medak, 231 La. 923, 93 So. 2d 217 (1957).
93. Bourgeat v. Dumoulin, 12 La. Ann. 204 (1857). Potts v. Potts, 142 La.
906, 77 So. 786 (1918) and Succession of Savory, 32 La. Ann. 506 (1880) lend
support to this proposition. Of course, the annuity must be paid or the donation
will not be upheld. Baker v. Baker, 125 La. 969, 52 So. 115 (1910).
It is not necessary that the property reserved be immovable. Nunge v.
Cegretto, 3 Orl. App. 39, 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905). But cf. Lagrange v.
Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845) (donation annulled as one omnium bonorum
even though not mentioned that donor had divested himself of all his movable as
well as immovable property).
94. Litton v. Stephens, 187 La. 918, 175 So. 619 (1937) ; Welch v. Forest
Lumber Co., 151 La. 960, 92 So. 400 (1922) ; Cox v. Busch-Everett Oil Co.,
131 La. 817, 60 So. 256 (1812) ; Rocques v. Freeman, 125 La. 60, 51 So. 68
(1910) ; Harris v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904) ; Beaulieu v. Monin,
50 La. Ann. 732, 23 So. 937 (1898) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845) ;
Lemoine v. Lemoine, 27 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946). (Vick v. Deshautel,
9 Mart. (O.S.) 85 (La. 1820) might appear to be contra, but it was decided under
the Code of 1808, which contained no counterpart to Article 1497; furthermore,
the facts failed to show the donor divested himself of all his property.) But see
notes 100-17 infra, and accompanying text.
95. Jaco v. Jaco, 129 La. 621, 56 So. 615 (1911) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d
787 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). But see notes 118-31 infra, and accompanying
text.
96. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1514 (1870) ; Garcia v. Dulcich, 237 La. 359, 111
So. 2d 309 (1959) ; Jaco v. Jaco, 120 La. 621, 56 So. 615 (1911). This, of course,
pretermits any consideration of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1526 (1870). On this question, see notes 118-31 infra, and accompanying text.
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ticle 1497 ;9 however, later cases have held tender is not required if the donor is the plaintiff, on the rationale that an
opposite holding would deprive the donor of the protection of
Article 1497, inasmuch as the donation itself presumably divested him of any property with which to make the tender. 98 The
proper solution, as allowed in an analogous case, apparently is
for the donee to reconvene for the value of his expenses. 99
Obligationof Support in Non-Donative Contracts
An oft-quoted statement of the rationale of the rule forbidding a charge of support to satisfy Article 1497 is that "it is
manifest... that the law maker never intended that on a simple stipulation of alimony, a man should divest himself of all his
property by donation inter vivos."'0 It seems possible, however,
that an obligation of support on the donee in a bargaining transaction may convert a donation into an onerous contract. Bargaining is inconsistent with the donor's spirit of liberality, a
prerequisite for the donation. 10 1 The transaction is bilateral in
nature, creating rights and correlative duties in each party to
the contract. 10 2 On the failure of one to perform, the other may
sue for a resolution of the contract. 0 3 In this, the donor's rights
are not enlarged by characterizing the transaction an onerous
contract; a donation also may be revoked for non-fulfillment of
a condition. 10 4 But characterization as onerous would give the
"donor" a right to damages for breach of the contract, 10 5 not
available upon revocation of a donation. No case was found
where a donor attempted to recover damages from the donee for
97. Pugh v. Cantey, 33 La. Ann. 786 (1881) (suit by executor of deceased
donor). Accord, Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944) (dictum)
(suit by donors, but person to be supported one other than a donor) ; Landry v.
Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888) (dictum) (suit by forced heirs).
98. Ackerman v. Larner, 116 La. 101, 40 So. 581 (1906) ; Harris v. Wafer,
113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942) (dictum). Cf. Fontenot v. Manuel, 46 La. Ann. 1373 (1894) (no
tender necessary if donation void under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1533 (1870) ; but
donee may recover on reconventional demand).
99. Fontenot v. Manuel, 46 La. Ann. 1373 (1894).
100. Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302, 309 (La. 1845).
101. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1467 (1870) (general article in title on donations; property can be acquired or disposed of "gratuitously" only by donation) ;
Succession of Formby, 243 La. 120 .......
142 So. 2d 157, 161 (1962) ("The
gratuitous donation is a pure donation in its motive, which is one of liberality."
Opinion on original hearing; result different on rehearing.).
102. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1765 (1870).
103. Id. art. 2046.
104. Id. art. 1559(2).
105. Id. arts. 1930-1944, 2046.
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non-fulfillment of the charge of support However, the only
case found that dealt expressly with the question whether an
obligation of support could be counted valid consideration for
the transfer of property answered in the affirmative. But it
must be observed that the case, Thielman v. Gahlman,0 6 concerned a transferor who had not divested himself of all his property, and thus was not left destitute; Article 1497 was not violated and the case is not direct authority where the article is
applicable.
In Thielman the transferor conveyed to his nephew the
naked ownership of certain immovable property, "for, and in
consideration of, one dollar, and other good and valuable considerations, in hand paid.' 1 0 7 The transferee agreed to give his
uncle a home for the duration of the latter's life, and bury him
when dead; the uncle retained the usufruct of the property during his life. Upon the transferor's death 21/2 months after the
conveyance, his heirs (the record did not show whether they
were forced or collateral) attacked the conveyance on the
ground, inter alia, that the contract was not a valid donation
since it was not in proper form. The court dismissed this contention, saying the contract was not a donation, and the consideration for the transfer of the naked ownership of the property
was "the obligation of the defendant [nephew] to maintain and
care for the grantor [uncle] during the remainder of his life,
and to bury him, when dead."'' 0 Plaintiffs further contended
that the transfer could not be upheld as a sale because the price
was uncertain, or as a donation inter vivos because the grantor
retained the usufruct. The court rejected these contentions,
holding the transaction an innominate contract translative of
ownership. 0 9
106. 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907).
107. Id. at 352, 44 So. at 124.
108. Id. at 353, 44 So. at 124. The court also noted in dictum: "[if
the
grantor had made the conveyance in question in consideration of the obligation
of the defendant for 10 years, and defendant had fully discharged that obligation,
he (the grantor) would not have been allowed to recover the property so conveyed, on the ground that such a contract is unknown to our law." Id. at 356,
44 So. at 125.
109. "[IUt was entirely competent for [the transferor] to convey the property . . . to his nephew in consideration of the obligation which the latter is
shown to have assumed, it appearing that the grantor reserved 'to himself enough
for his subsistence.' It is true that, whether a particular contract is a sale or a
donation is a question of law, but it may be neither the one nor the other, and
yet operate a transfer of property." Id. at 354, 44 So. at 125. The court relied
on Articles 1777 and 1900 of the Code, and two cases, i.e., Phelan v. Wilson,
114 La. 823, 38 So. 570 (1905) and Helluin v. Minor, 12 La. Ann. 125 (1875).
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Although recognizing that a then-recent case 10 had said that
"'contracts whereby individuals have transferred their property
to others, burdened with the charge that they should be maintained during their lives, have heretofore been dealt:with . . .
as onerous donations'; and that the court found no reason for
pursuing a different course in that case," the court in Thielman
distinguished the case on the ground that the donor had conveyed all her property and the transfer therefore fell within the
proscription of Article 1497.111 But the court did not rest there;
it further noted: "It does not follow, however, because of that
jurisprudence that every transfer of property which has for its
consideration an obligation of maintenance is to be regarded as
a donation." 1 2 The contract based upon an obligation of support in the transferee was likened to that in a case which appears to have involved a commutative, aleatory contract."l8 It
should be noted that the court in Thielman had earlier, in repulsing an attack based upon lesion beyond moiety, referred to
4
the transaction in question as an aleatory contract.1
Since the court nowhere mentioned Article 1526, the Thielman case apparently cannot be explained away on the ground
that it involved an onerous donation not subject to the rules
peculiar to donations.'" Thielman thus seems authority for the
proposition that a transferor may make a contract not a donation (and thus not subject to the restrictions placed on donations) with another, the "consideration" furnished by the other
being an obligation on his part to support the transferor, provided the latter has retained enough for his subsistence in the
event the former fails to perform his obligation. In the event
of such a breach, it is submitted that the aggrieved party should
be allowed such damages as he actually sustains and proves.""
The case further intimates in dictum that even if the party to
be supported does not retain property sufficient for his sub110. Ackerman v. Larner, 116 La. 101, 117, 40 So. 581, 587 (1905).
111. 119 La. at 355, 44 So. at 125.
112. Id. at 356, 44 So. at 125.
113. Kirk v. Railroad Co., 51 La. Ann. 667, 25 So. 457 (1899).
114. 119 La. at 353, 44 So. at 124.
115. Note also that the transferee had fully complied with the obligations
of support and to bury the transferor when dead. However, the transferor only
lived about 2 1/2 months after the transfer of the property. Since the property
was valued at $3,300, it seems unlikely that the value of the services and expenses of the burial exceeded two-thirds of this figure in the year 1907. Thus it
appears that a mere application of Article 1526 could not have saved the transaction being classified as a. donation subject to the rules peculiar to donations.
116. LA. CiviL CoDE arts., 1930-1944, 2046 (1870).
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sistence, nevertheless the transaction is not ipso facto a dona117
tion.
Article 1526 and Its Effect on Onerous Donations
The action to annul a donation omnium bonorum often is not
brought until years after confection of the donation. Then, if
the donee has satisfied the condition of supporting the donor,
the expenditures of support are held to be the "charge imposed"
mentioned in the onerous donation of Articles 1524 and 1526.
Consequently, since Article 1497 is a rule peculiar to donations,
should the facts show that the value of the thing given 18 did
not exceed by one-half the value of the charges imposed, 119 it
has no application. 12 0 Similarly, on these facts neither Articles
117. See the quotations from Thielman in notes 108-09 supra, and in the text
at note 112 supra.
The following cases, none of which (as best can be determined from the
opinions) dealt with a transferor who left himself destitute by the conveyance,
seem to lend support to the holding in Thielman: Balzrette v. Hughes, 232 La.
509, 94 So. 2d 649 (1957) ("obligation" of transferee to furnish home for transferor allowed as part consideration for conveyance) ; Citizens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935) (agreement to care for transferor
valid consideration for transfer; contract not contrary to law or public policy
even though agreement not recited in act) ; Moore v. Wartelle, 39 La. Ann. 1067,
3 So. 384 (1887) ("obligation" assumed by transferee to support transferor
counted as part of consideration) ; Ryals v. Ryals, 199 So. 481 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1940) ("obligation" of support good consideration for transfer of immovable
property). See notes 135, 136 infra. See also the discussion of Thielman and
Garcia v. Dulcich, 237 La. 359, 111 So. 2d 309 (1959) in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term - Conventional Obligations,
20 LA. L. REV. 224, 225 (1960).
Another case of interest in this area is Quarles v. Quarles, 179 So. 512 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1938). It appears that the court there held the transferee obligated
to the transferor when the consideration for the transfer was partly cash and
partly an obligation of the transferee to support the transferor for life. In fact,
after a determination that the services were worth $6 per month, the court ordered the transferee to pay to the estate of the transferor that amount for each
month that the transferor had not lived with the transferee prior to her death.
118. The "value of the thing given" refers to its value at the time of donation,
not the time of suit. Steen v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 39 (2d
Cir. 1925).
119. No case was found which discussed the possibility of valuing the "charges
imposed" as of the time of donation by actuarial standards.
120. Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944) ; Potts v. Potts,
142 La. 906, 77 So. 786 (1918) ; Succession of Dopier v. Feigle, 40 La. Ann. 848,
6 So. 106 (1888) ; Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888) ; Pugh
v. Cantey, 33 La. Ann. 786 (1881) ; Lafield v. Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1945). Contra, Lemoine v. Lemoine, 27 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1946). In the last case, the court, after referring to the Landry and Lafield cases,
supra, said: "From our examination of all the authorities cited in the briefs in
this case and others that we have found, we are of the opinion that Articles
1514 and 1526, R.C.C., have no reference to Article 1497, R.C.C., but on the
contrary refer to excessive donations not reprobated by the provisions of Article
1497." Id. at 653. No reason is given to support this opinion. The case seems
clearly wrong on this point. However, notwithstanding the court's choice to base
its decision on this ground, it agreed with the district judge's finding that the
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1536 and 1538, requiring a donation inter vivos to be by authentic act,12 1 nor Article 1533, prohibiting the donor from reserving
122
to himself the usufruct of the donated immovable property,
apply. Again, the party alleging invalidity of the transaction has
the burden of proving that the value of the object given exceeds
by one-half that of the charges imposed. 1 If he bears his burden, although the donation cannot be reduced below the expenses
incurred by the donee in meeting the charge, 124 the amount exceeding such expenses may be subject to reduction 125 or colla126
tion.
Although no definitive decision was found in point,1 27 it is
donee had failed to meet the condition or charge imposed on him, and the result
can be sustained on this basis.
Of course, if the value of the thing given does exceed the value of the charge
by one-half, Article 1497 is applicable. Baker v. Baker, 125 La. 969, 52 So. 115
(1910) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845).
121. Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944) ; Potts v. Potts,
142 La. 906, 77 So. 786 (1918). The opinion in Castleman v. Smith, 155 La.
367, 99 So. 293 (1924) may be contra by implication. Though not clear, it
appears the court found the transaction was an onerous donation not subject to
the rules peculiar to donations, then concluded the "defect" of its not being in
notarial form had prescribed.
122. Succession of Dopler v. Feigle, 40 La. Ann. 848, 6 So. 106 (1888). It
should be noted that the Feigle case also held that if the transferor has reserved
the usufruct, the value of the usufruct is deducted from the total value of the
property transferred in computing "the value of the object given" for purposes
of Articles 1523 and 1526. But if the usufruct is given to a third person
(Article 1533 does not prohibit this, so that the donation must be attacked on
some other ground) apparently no such deduction is made; moreover, the donee
cannot count the value of the usufruct as part of the burden or charge imposed
on him by the donor. The usufruct of the property given in the act of donation
to one other than the donor cannot be counted as "onerous in so far as the donee
[is] concerned," for "the donee only [has] to recognize the usufruct." Latour v.
Guillory, 130 La. 570, 578, 58 So. 341, 344 (1912).
123. Castleman v. Smith, 148 La. 233, 86 So. 778 (1920) ; Potts v. Potts,
142 La. 906, 77 So. 786 (1918) ; Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910)
Lafield v. Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
124. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1514

(1870)

("Donations,

by which charges are

imposed on the donee, can never be reduced below the expenses which the donee
has incurred to perform them") ; Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728
(1888).
125. No case was found that held this, but the result is clearly dictated by
the language of Article 1514. See the cases discussed in note 126 infra, where
this rule was stated in collation cases, apparently by analogy to Article 1514,
which deals with reduction. Also, the cases applying Article 1514's companion
article concerning remunerative donations, Article 1513, could well be used as
authority by analogy. See the cases cited in notes 162, 163 infra.
126. In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952) ; Steen v. Louisiana
Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 39 (2d Cir. 1925). As to the possibility of this
rule's having been stated as dictum in these cases, see note 127 infra. Article
1514 of the Civil Code treats of the reduction of excessive donations. Although
the court in these cases did not mention this article, apparently it was resorted
to by analogy for the proposition stated in the text. Furthermore, the court in
Andrus relied for support of the proposition advanced on cases which dealt with
reduction. A similar problem is encountered in remunerative donations. See note
168 infra.
127. In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952) may be taken to sup-
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submitted that if application of Article 1526128 reveals the:trans-

fer is an onerous donation, but not subject to the rules peculiar
to donations, then the transfer should be upheld for the whole,

not just the value of the charge, even if the whole exceeds both
the value of the charge and the disposable portion. This is so
because the articles relating to collation'2" and reduction' 8" are
rules peculiar to donations, and should not be applied where the
transaction is an onerous contract by virtue of Article 1526.131
Sundry Exhortations on Onerous Donations
If the value of the object given does not exceed by one-half
the value of the charge imposed, the ordinary rules of contract
port inferentially the argument advanced in the text, at least in dictum. In

this

case plaintiffs averred, inter alia, that certain donations in contest should be
collated. Defendants countered with the contention that they were onerous donations which by virtue of Article 1526 were not subject to the rules peculiar to
donations, and consequently were not subject to collation. The trial court had
sustained defendants' exception of no cause or right of action, and dismissed
plaintiffs' suit. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, remarking: "[A]s the law provides that where the value of the object donated exceeds
by one-half the value of the charges imposed or services rendered, the amount
over and above the value of such charges or services is subject to collation, and
this then becomes a matter of proof." 221 La. at 1007, 60 So. 2d at 903. The
negative implication of this statement is that if it had been proved that the value
of the object given had not exceeded by one-half the value of the charges imposed,
the amount over and above the value of such charges would not have been subject
to collation. However, Steen v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 39
(2d Cir. 1925) is to the contrary, at least in dictum. Although plaintiffs' demand for annulment of a conveyance was denied because "the condition of the
proof [did] not enable [the court] to determine whether the real value of the
property at the time of the transfer did or did not exceed by one-half the charges
imposed," plaintiffs' rights to make such proof in another suit were reserved. Id.
at 43. The court said: "[B]ut if the value at the time of the transfer did not
exceed by one-half the charges imposed, it would not, we think, be null [for lack
of proper form] and plaintiffs' sole right would be to demand collation to the
extent that the value did exceed the charges, if it exceeded them at all." Ibid.
The court further observed: "Of course, too, the right should be reserved to plaintiffs to demand collation, even if the transfer be valid as an onerous donation."
Ibid.
128. Many early cases failed to determine the nature of the transaction by
applying the test of Article 1526. E.g., Latour v. Guillory, 130 La. 570, 58 So.
341 (1912) ; Succession of Dopler v. Feigle, 40 La. Ann. 848, 6 So. 106 (1888) ;
Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888) ; Pugh v. Cantey, 33 La.
Ann. 786 (1881) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845).
However, later cases have tended to apply it. E.g., In re Andrus, 221 La.
996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952) ; Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633
(1944); Lafield v. Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945); Steen
v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 39 (2d Cir. 1925).
Whether the test has been met is a matter of proof to be decided by a trial
on the merits. In re Andrus, supra. Conceding that difficult evaluation problems
will sometimes be encountered in making this computation, it nevertheless is
clearly required in view of the explicit language of Article 1526, which merely
makes specific the general rule of Article 1524.
129. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1227-1288 (1870).
130. Id. art. 1514.
131. The cases cited in note 132 infra stand for the proposition: that the

1963]

COMMENTS

law applyto the conveyance. 132 Consequently, the contract may,
as may any other onerous contract, be dissolved for nonperformance. of the charge or condition. 13 A recent case intimated there
is a presumption that the condition of support and care has not
been complied with if the donor leaves the home of the donee,
1 34
for "it would be unnatural for him to leave" without cause.
If the sole consideration for the transfer is the donee's promise to care for the donor, the transfer cannot be upheld as a sale
because it lacks a price in current money. 135 However, the expenses incurred in fulfilling the promise to support the transferor can be counted in a sale as part of the consideration paid
by the transferee." 36 Further, if the obligation to support is
onerous donation not subject to the rules peculiar to donations is subject to the
rules regulating onerous contracts. A similar situation is presented as to remunerative donations and LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1513 (1870). See text accompanying notes 162-69 infra.
132. Garcia v. Dulcich, 237 La. 359, 111 So. 2d 309 (1959); Whitman v.
Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944); Castleman v. Smith, 148 La. 233,
86 So. 778 (1920) ; Succession of Dopler v. Feigle, 40 La. Ann. 848, 6 So. 106
(1888) ; Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888) ; Pugh v. Cantey,
33 La. Ann. 786 (1881) ; Lafield v. Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1945).
133. Garcia v. Dulcich, 237 La. 359, 111 So. 2d 309 (1959) ; Moore v. Sucher,
234 La. 1068, 102 So. 459 (1958) (not a services-about-the-home case) ; Lemoine
v. Lemoine, 27 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) (dictum) ; Lafield v. Balzrette,
21 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) (dictum).
The opinion in Garcia v. Dulcich, supra, pointed out that it was immaterial
whether the test of Article 1526 was met if the condition of support had been
violated because the contract then could be dissolved whether it was a donation
or an onerous contract. The court relied on Moore v. Sucher, supra, and LA.
CIvIn CODE arts. 2045, 2046, 2561, 2130 (1870).

Likewise, even an onerous donation subject to the rules of donations that
does not run afoul of Articles 1497, 1533, and 1536, is subject to revocation, if
the donee fails to maintain the condition of support. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1559
(1870) ; Hurley v. Hurley, 146 La. 337, 83 So. 643 (1920).
Although it may be an implied condition of the onerous donation that the
donee will not dispose of the property transferred to him, this condition is not
violated by a sale that is absolutely necessary for compliance with the condition
of support. Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944).
134. Garcia v. Dulcich, 237 La. 359, 367, 111 So. 2d 309, 312 (1959).
135. Harris v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904) ; Hearsey v. Craig,
126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910) (dictum). Contra, Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935) (mother not in need; son assumed
obligation to support; act recited cash consideration of $3,000). The Citizens
Bank case appears not to accord with LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2439 and 2464
(1870), insofar as it sustained the conveyance as a sale. However, the result
seems justifiable under the decision in Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44
So. 123 (1907), which recognized that although neither a sale nor a donation
may be involved, yet a conveyance may be upheld as an innominate contract
translative of -property. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1777 (1870) was relied on. See notes
100-17 supra, and accomanying text.
136. Balzrette v. Hughes, 232 La. 509, 94 So. 2d 649 (1957) ; Succession of
Dopier v. Feigle, 40 La. Ann. 848, 6 So. 106 (1888) ; Moore v. Wartelle, 39 La.
Ann, 1067, 3 So. 384 (1887) ; Quarles v. Quarles, 179 So. 512 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1938). Cf. Succession of Viola, 138 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962)
(transfer in form of sale not remunerative donation where stated consideration
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not expressed in the act of transfer, Article 1900137 can be invoked to show the true "consideration" was not that recited in
the act. 3 8 Even though the price recited was not paid, if the
value of the services rendered in fulfilling the condition of support exceeds two-thirds the value of the thing transferred, the
transaction may be upheld as an onerous donation not subject
to the rules peculiar to donations.8 9
The fairly recent Supreme Court case of Whitman v. Whitman14 involved several interesting issues. It was the only case
found in which the charge imposed upon the donee was to support not the donor, but a third party - the mother of the contracting parties. The donation was upheld since the total value
of the services rendered in support of the mother before and

after the conveyance exceeded two-thirds the value of the property conveyed. Thus, the court expressly recognized that a donation may at the same time be both an "onerous donation, and to

some extent, a remunerative donation, '1 41 and that addition of
the value of the services to be recompensed and those later rendered is proper in applying Article 1526.142
Importance of Who Is the Plaintiff
From the jurisprudence concerning suits to annul onerous
included, inter alia, services rendered transferor; services held part consideration).
137. LA. CrviL CODE art. 1900 (1870).
138. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935)
Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907) ; Ryals v. Ryals, 199 So.
481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940). Parol evidence is admissbile to show the true
nature of the transaction. Ducote v. Stark, 87 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1956), and cases cited therein at 773.
139. Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888); Lafield v.
Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
140. 206 La. 1, 18 So.2d 633 (1944).
1.41. Id. at 17, 18 So. 2d at 638.
142. Accord, Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910). Since, in
Whitman, the donee was the child of the person to be cared for, and since the
latter was in penurious circumstances, the donors objected that the donee was
under an existing obligation to render support for her by operation of law. (This
obligation is discussed in detail in the text following note 44 supra.) The court
disposed of this by noting that not only was the donee under such a duty, but
"it was imposed also upon all of the donors, as a solidary obligation." 206 La.
at 21, 18 So. 2d at 640. Thus, assumption of the full burden of the mother's
support was more than the donee was obligated by law to do because it denied
the donee a right to demand contribution from the other solidary obligors, the
donors, and could be counted as a charge imposed on him by his contract with
them. See notes 50-53 supra, and accompanying text, for discussion of the contribution question. Since the contract between donors and donee could not affect
the rights of the mother, the donors were of course still obligated to care for
their mother under Article 229 if penurious circumstances were again to befall
her.
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donations it appears to be of prime importance whether suit to
annul is brought by the donor or by another. In fourteen of
seventeen cases found in which the donor was attacking the
transfer, the donation was annulled. 14 3 But of seventeen cases
in which either heirs or creditors of the donor were the plaintiffs, the donation was upheld in fifteen, 144 one was remanded

for trial on the merits,'1 45 and the donation was annulled outright
in only one. 14 It seems beyond cavil that this is not mere coincidence. 147 More likely, it is an unexpressed 48 recognition by
the courts that if the donor failed to attack the donation during his life, he must have been satisfied with the care rendered
him by the donee in fulfillment of his charge.
REMUNERATIVE DONATIONS
IN RECOGNITION OF SERVICES RENDERED

The Relationship of Civil Obligations,
Remunerative Donations, and Article 1526
Presumably, when the lawmakers came to deal with remu143. Annulled: Garcia v. Dulcich, 237 La. 359, 111 So. 2d 309 (1959) ; Weems
v. Medak, 231 La. 923, 93 So. 2d 217 (1957) ; Welch v. Forest Lumber Co.,
151 La. 960, 92 So. 400 (1922); Hurley v. Hurley, 146 La. 337, 83 So. 643
(1920) ; Cox v. Busch-Everett Oil Co., 131 La. 817, 60 So. 256 (1912) ; Jaco v.
Jaco, 129 La. 621, 56 So. 615 (1911) ; Baker v. Baker, 125 La. 969, 52 So. 115
(1910) ; Rocques v. Freeman, 125 La. 60, 51 So. 68 (1909) ; Harris v. Wafer,
113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904) ; Beaulieu v. Monin, 50 La. Ann. 732, 23 So.
937 (1898) ; Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845) ; Ducote v. Stark, 87
So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Lemoine v. Lemoine, 27 So. 2d 650 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1946) ; Hearon v. Davis, 8 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
Not annulled: Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944)
(donors not person to be supported) ; Lafield v. Balzrette, 21 So. 2d 156 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1945) (services rendered clearly exceeded not only two-thirds but
entire value of thing given) ; Nunge v. Cegretto, 3 Orl. App. 39 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1905).
144. Balzrette v. Hughes, 232 La. 509, 94 So. 2d 649 (1957) ; Citizens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935) ; Prater v. Porter, 176
La. 324, 145 So. 675 (1933) ; Potts v. Potts, 142 La. 906, 77 So. 786 (1918) ;
Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910); Thielman v. Gahlman, 119
La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907) (transaction not considered donation) ; Bernard v.
Noel, 45 La. Ann. 1135, 13 So. 737 (1893) ; Succession of Dopler v. Feigle, 40
La. Ann. 848, 6 So. 106 (1888) ; Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728
(1888) ; Moore v. Wartelle, 39 La. Ann. 1067, 3 So. 384 (1887) ; Pugh v. Cantey,
33 La. Ann. 786 (1881) ; Succession of Savory, 32 La. Ann. 506 (1880) ; Bourgeat v. Dumoulin, 12 La. Ann. 204 (1857) ; Ryals v. Ryals, 199 So. 481 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Succession of Bradley, 8 La. App. 260 (Orl. Cir. 1928).
145. In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952).
146. Litton v. Stephens, 187 La. 918, 175 So. 619 (1937).
147. At least two cases expressly distinguished prior cases on the ground that
they had concerned suits in which one other than the donor was attacking the
donation. Cox v. Busch-Everett Oil Co., 131 La. 817, 60 So. 256 (1912) ; Harris
v. Wafer, 113 La. 822, 37 So. 768 (1904).
148. One case recognized this expressly: Bernard v. Noel, 45 La. Ann. 1135,
1136,.13 So. 737 (1893) ("[Ajs no complaint was ever made to the contrary, we
must presume [the donee] complied with his obligations.").
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nerative donations 149 :they were not undertaking primarily to
characterize transfers designed to satisfy an existing civil obligation, because such transfers would constitute merely a giving
in payment (an onerous contract).'5° Rather, their primary object apparently was to deal with transfers intended to recompense for services rendered in the past which, although appreciable in money,' 5 1 would not give rise to a civil obligation to
pay. And they provided that transfers of this kind would be
treated as donations if -

and as onerous contracts unless -

the

value of the thing given exceeded by one-half the value of the
services rendered. 152 However, a person owing a civil obligation might transfer to his obligee property considerably more
valuable than the obligation he owes to express his appreciation
for the benefit he has received. In this event, the transferor
might be considered moved by a spirit of liberality to the extent that the value of the property transferred exceeds the
amount of the indebtedness. 53 That the lawmakers intended to
deal with this situation in adopting the rules relating to remunerative donations is not clear. It seems clear, however, that
these rules are susceptible of application to such a case; but if
applied, the transfer should never be reduced below the amount
54
of the debt.1
149. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1513, 1523, 1525, 1526 (1870).
150. See 3 TOULLIER-DUVERGIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 186

(6th ed.

1846-48) : "The remunerative donation is that which is made to compensate services rendered to the donor or his family: . . . . If the services rendered have a
monetary value for which the donee has a right of action to enforce payment, the
contract has of a donation nothing but the name." (Translation from the original
French by Carlos E. Lazarus, Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.)
See note 200 infra for a discussion of the giving in payment.
151. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1525 (1870).

152. Id. art. 1526. See generally Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA.
L. REV. 2, 16-19 (1951).
153. This is apparently the manner in which the French treat such transactions. See AUBRY ET RAU ET ESMEIN, DRoIT CIVIL § 644 (6th ed. 1954):
"[T]hese acts of disposition will be subjected to the rules of donations only to
the extent that the amounts are considered exaggerated remunerations." (Translation from the original French by Carlos E. Lazarus, Associate Professor of Law,
Louisiana State University.) ; Schiller, The Counterpart of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, in REPORT OF THE NEW YORK (STATE) LAW REVISION COMmiSSION 187, 210 (1936) : "Appeal Toulouse, Dec. 28, 1892: A promised donation of a specified sum to a domestic servant, made by ordinary contract (acte
sous seing privd) in recompense for services rendered is null for the portion which
is a pure liberality, but valid up to the amount of the value of the services.
(Sirey 1893, 2, 209.)."
154. LA. CIVIL COnE art. 1513 (1870).

The argument advanced in note 77 supra, dealing with the exclusiveness vel
non of natural obligations listed in Article 1758, suggests that Article 1526 may
be applicable to cases involving an existing civil obligation. However, the argument would seem to be supportable on a contrary conclusion, since the words
used- "in which a duty to pay would never arise" - could refer to a natural
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Applicability of Article 1526 to Donations
Mortis Causa

Although Articles 1523 through 1526 appear in a chapter
of the Civil Code that deals with donations inter vivos, 155 Succession of Henry'5 6 held their provisions relative to remunerative donations 157 were likewise intended to apply to donations
mortis causa. 15 By necessary implication, this holding extended
Article 1526 to exempt remunerative donations, if they met the
test of that article, from those rules that are peculiar to all do-

nations, whether inter vivos or mortis causa. 159 Since most atobligation in the context employed; and the hypothetical situation excluded by
hypothesis the existence of a civil obligation. Note 77 supra dealt with the situation where the value of the thing given did not exceed by one-half the value of
the services, and the services were rendered under circumstances such that some
kind of duty to pay had arisen. The discussion in the text accompanying and
preceding this note deals with a situation in which the value of the thing given
greatly exceeds the value of the services rendered, and again a duty to pay,
specifically, a civil obligation, had arisen. In the former situation it would appear
inequitable to reduce the transfer to the value of the services. See note 77 supra
(2d ). Yet, in the latter situation, there appears no good reason to allow the
transfer to stand for the full value, regardless of how much this value may exceed
that of the services, merely because there was an original civil obligation to pay
for the services. This problem suggests again that perhaps the safest path to
characterizing such a transaction lies in ascertaining the transferor's purpose,
motive, or cause. See generally Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L.
REv. 2 (1951).
155. LA. CIVIL CODE ch. 5, "Of donations inter vivos (between living persons)"
(1870). Articles 1523 and 1526 expressly refer to donations inter vivos.
156. 158 La. 516, 104 So. 310 (1925).
157. Generally, donations mortis causa will be remunerative rather than onerous. However, it would seem possible that an onerous donation may be made
mortis causa, i.e., where the charge is to support someone other than the donor.
Cf. Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944) (donation inter vivos;
charge on donee to support mother of donors). It is submitted that, should such
a case ever arise, the rationale of the Henry case is broad enough to include onerous donations mortis causa within its rule.
158. Henry has universally been followed on this point. E.g., Succession of
Formby, 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157 (1962) ; Succession of Formby, 127 So. 2d
852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Succession of Forestier, 11 So. 2d 253 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1942) (dictum). These articles had been previously applied without
discussion to donations mortis causa. E.g., Graves v. Graves, 10 La. Ann. 212
(1855) ; Succession of Fox, 2 Rob. 292 (La. 1842). The propriety of this was
questioned and left unanswered in an earlier case, Succession of Jackson, 47 La.
Ann. 1089, 17 So. 598 (1895), but it was not until the Henry case, a century
after the adoption of the articles, that the question was discussed in detail by the
Supreme Court.
The court in Henry relied on the relationship of numerous articles of the Code,
and especially Article 1520, in determining that a remunerative donation could
be made by donation mortis causa. 158 La. at 522-24, 104 So. at 312-13. Also,
the court was particularly impressed that "the right to make a remunerative
donation in a last will and testament had passed . . . unchallenged" for a hundred years prior to this case. Id. at 524, 104 So. at 313. This result
seems justified both as an interpretation of the Code, and as a practical matter.
There appears to be no objection to remuneration by will rather than by donation inter vivos for past services rendered. See Comment, 19 TUL. L. REV. 265,
269-72 (1944).
159. That is, as donations mortis causa were brought within the compass of
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tacks on remunerative donations involve opposition of the
donor's heirs or legatees to the donor's will, the holding of the
Henry case has been extremely important.
It is submitted that in view of Henry and later cases1 60 Article 1526 is to be interpreted as if it read "the rules peculiar
to donations inter vivos, and the rules peculiar to donations
whether inter vivos or mortis causa" are inapplicable except
when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half the value
of the services. However, it would seem the rules peculiar only
to donations mortis causa, such as those relating to form, capacity, and caducity are generally applicable even if the test of
61
Article 1526 is met.
Reduction of Remunerative Donations
It has uniformly been held that a remunerative donation cannot be reduced below the value of the services rendered,'16 2 even
Article 1526, the rules controlling them were made inapplicable if the value of
the services exceeded two-thirds that of the object given. This follows by necessary implication of the holding despite the court's statement: "The rules relative to donations inter vivos are not applicable to the bequest in this case, as the
value of the services rendered exceed the value of the property." 158 La. at 526,
104 So. at 314. The rules peculiar only to donations inter vivos would not be
applicable in any event to a bequest for it is a donation mortis causa.
It should be noted, however, that it would not be entirely accurate to say that
Article 1526 exempts remunerative donations mortis causa from those rules
peculiar only to donations mortis causa, i.e., Title II, Chapter 6 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. These articles prescribe the rules for form, revocation, interpretation, caducity, etc., of testaments and legacies. It would seem a remunerative
donation made by testament would have to conform to these rules regardless of
the respective values of the thing given and services rendered. E.g., Succession
of Forestier, 11 So. 2d 253 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (caducity). See note 183
(1st ) infra. The remedy of the renderer/legatee, should the donation run afoul
of these rules, apparently would be a claim against the estate of the recipient,
as discussed in text at pages 416-28 supra. See, e.g., Succession of Joublanc, 199
La. 250, 5 So. 2d 762 (1941) (revocation of will containing remunerative donation; recovery allowed) ; Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930) (last
will abortive for lack of form; recovery allowed). Cf. Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La.
App. 192 (1st Cir. 1.924) (donation inter vivos to remunerate for services void;
recovery allowed). If there are rules contained within these articles with which
certain remunerative donations should not have to comply, this should be ascertained by a case-by-case approach. It would, however, seem safe to say that the
rules contained in Title II, Chapters 3-5, and most of those in Chapter 2, fall
within the ambit of Article 1526. When it is said in this Comment that the "rules
peculiar to donations" do not apply (a term used for brevity), these restrictions
must be kept in mind.
160. E.g., Succession of Formby, 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157 (1962) ; Succession of Gilbert, 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953).
161. See note 159 (2d ) supra. See also note 183 (1st ) infra.
162. Succession of Gilbert, 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953) ; Kiper v. Kiper,
214 La. 733, 38 So. 2d 507 (1949) ; Succession of Faust, 189 La. 417, 179 So.
583 (1938) (collation) ; Winbarg v. Winbarg, 177 La. 1071, 150 So. 21 (1933) ;
Graves v. Graves, 10 La. Ann. 212 (1855) ; Succession of Fox, 2 Rob. 292 (La.
1842).
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though it infringes upon the legitime of forced heirs. 1 3 These
rulings clearly accord with Article 1513, found in that section
of the Code dealing with reduction of donations inter vivos and
mortis causa.164 It is commonly stated that no reduction can
be made if the value of the services is equal to or greater than
the value of the thing given, 65 the negative implication being
that if the value of the services is at all less than the value of
the thing given, reduction may be required. However, Succession of Henry6 6 stated the rule as follows: "[A] remunerative
donation may be reduced to the value of the services rendered,
when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of
the services. R.C.C. art. 1526." 16'
(Emphasis added.) If the
163. Succession of Gilbert, 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953) ; Kiper v. Kiper,
214 La. 733, 38 So. 2d 507 (1949) ; Winbarg v. Winbarg, 177 La. 1071, 150 So.
21 (1933) ; Succession of Ames, 33 La. Ann. 1317 (1881) ; Graves v. Graves, 10
La. Ann. 212 (1855) ; Succession of Fox, 2 Rob. 292 (La. 1842).
Only if the legitime is invaded does the value of the services become material;
otherwise the declaration of their value by the donor or testator is conclusive and
cannot be questioned by his heirs. Winbarg v. Winbarg, supra (donation mortis
causa) ; Miller v. Andrus, 2 La. Ann. 767 (1847) (donation inter vivos) ; Succession of Fox, supra (donation mortis causa).
164. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1513 (1870) in Section 2, "Of The Reduction of
Dispositions Inter Vivos Or Mortis Causa; . . . "Remunerative donations can
never be reduced below the estimated value of the services rendered."
165. Kiper v. Kiper, 214 La. 733, 38 So. 2d 507 (1949) ; Winbarg v. Winbarg,
177 La. 1071, 150 So. 21 (1933) ; Graves v. Graves, 10 La. Ann. 212 (1855) (by
implication) ; Succession of Fox, 2 Rob. 292 (La. 1842) ; Succession of Formby,
127 So. 2d 352, 356 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ("If [a remunerative donation is]
established to be equal to or greater than the bequest, no reduction can be made;
otherwise it must be reduced to the estimated value of the services."). (Emphasis
added.)
166. 158 La. 516, 104 So. 310 (1925).
167. 158 La. at 524, 104 So. at 313. Actually, the court in Henry found that
the value of the services rendered exceeded the value of the legacy, so there was
no necessity to invoke the rule as stated.
Although it detracts from the rule of Henry as given in the text, the court
also stated: "But a remunerative donation cannot be reduced below the estimated
value of the services rendered, if the value of such services should be little inferior
to that of the gift, not even if such remunerative donation should trench upon
the legitime of forced heirs. R.C.C. arts. 1525, 1513." (Emphasis added.) Id. at
525, 104 So. at 313. The statement seems incorrect, for Article 1513 clearly says
that the remunerative donation can never be reduced below the value of the services. Thus the emphasized portion of the quotation adds nothing to the sentence.
It appears that the court, after having already stated its test by using the language of Article 1526, simply decided, for stylistic reasons, to vary the form and
use the language of Article 1525 to arrive at the same result. Unfortunately,
this did not succeed. More unfortunately, Henry was cited as standing for this
latter proposition in Succession of Gilbert, 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d 192 (1953).
The very recent case of Succession of Formby, 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157
(1962) might indicate a return to the rule as property established by Henry
despite its approval of certain language of a lower appellate court. The court in
Formby said "a [remunerative] donation can never be reduced, even when forced
heirs are concerned, below the value of the services rendered." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at ...... 142 So. 2d at 163. This statement in itself does not necessarily imply
a retreat from the proper rule of Henry, for it merely states a minimum standard, i.e., in no case can a remunerative donation be reduced below the value of
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value of the thing given is so approximated to the value of the
services that reduction would not result if the Henry test were
followed, it seems the transferor's intention was to pay for the
services rendered by transferring what he considered a fair
price. Furthermore, since Article 1513 states a rule peculiar to
donations, it should not govern a remunerative donation classed
as an onerous contract by virtue of Article 1526. Consequently,
it is submitted that the Henry test is sound, and reduction' 6 to
the value of the services should not be required unless the value
of the object given exceeds by one-half the value of the services
rendered. 16 9
the services; it does not say that in all cases such a donation will be reduced to
the value of the services. But the court subsequently noted that the court of
appeal had "properly observed and held . . . : 'The trial court concluded that the
value of the services rendered justified the bequest without reduction. Obviously,
the trial judge found that the value of the services rendered equaled or exceeded
the value of the property bequeathed.' " Id. at ...... 142 So. 2d at 166. Again, the
negative pregnant of this is that if the trial judge had not found that the value
of the services equaled the bequest reduction would have been in order. Notwithstanding the approval of this language by the Supreme Court, it is suggested that
Formby may be said to stand for the proposition that a remunerative donation
is not to be reduced to the value of the services if the thing given does not exceed
by one-half the value of such services, for this was the result reached. On original hearing the court determined that the value of the thing given was $10.000.
Id. at ...... , 142 So. 2d at 158. Although the judgment was different on rehearing,
nowhere is this valuation refuted. The value of the services was filed on rehearing at $250 per year. These services extended over a period of 33 years, 7
months, and 8 days, as appears from the Supreme Court opinion, supra, and
the court of appeal opinion, Succession of Formby, 127 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961). Thus, the services rendered were worth approximately $8402. This
is less than the value of the thing given; yet the court did not reduce the legacy
to the value of the services but let it stand in toto. It should be noted that the
thing given did not, however, exceed by one-half (approximately $12,603) the
value of the services.
168. Since the rules providing for collation, LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1227-1288
(1870), are also peculiar to donations, it is submitted that they are likewise
inapplicable in this situation, i.e., collation should not take place where the value
of the donation does not exceed by one-half the value of the services rendered.
Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203, 224 (1952) appears to agree with this view. In
fact, this argument is more easily made than the argument regarding reduction.
It has been held that collation is restricted to donations inter vivos. Succession
of Meyer, 198 La. 53, 3 So. 2d 273 (1941) ; Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 120
So. 275 (1929). Hence, it could be argued that the rules relating to collation,
unlike those relating to reduction, are rules peculiar to donations inter vivos
(Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203, 214-15 (1952)) and the problem discussed in
note 159 (2d ) supra is avoided.
169. Succession of Faust, 189 La. 417, 179 So. 583 (1938) illustrates that the
distinction can be important. Faust dealt with collation; yet the court applied
Article 1513, apparently by analogy. The court found that $6000 in bonds had
been given inter vivos by the deceased to the two defendants as a remunerative
donation in recompense for their services in caring and nursing for her. The
court further determined that the services were worth $4380 when appreciated in
money. It was held that the defendants had to collate the $1620 difference between th'e value of the things given and the value of the services. Had the court
used the test of reduction (by analogy for this collation case) set forth in Henry,
it would have discovered that the value of the donation ($6000) did not exceed
by one-half ($2190 [one-half of value of services] plus $4380 [value of services]
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Lack of Necessity of an Intention To Charge for the
Services and Inapplicability of the Presumptionof-Gratuity Rule

Although some earlier cases might be interpreted to the contrary, 170 Succession of Formby'7 ' expressly recognized that intentions of the renderer to charge and of the recipient to compensate at the time services were rendered is not required as the
basis for a remunerative donation; likewise, the presumptionof-gratuity rule concerning services rendered by a child to a parent not in need, which is merely a method of arriving at an intention to charge, was held inapplicable to a remunerative donation. The court properly noted that both rules apply only when
suit is against the succession of the recipient on a contract basis
172
in the absence of a valid donation.
equal $6570) the value of the services rendered ($4380), and therefore this remunerative donation was not properly subject to the rules peculiar to donations,
including collation.
170. E.g., Boggs v. Hays, 44 La. Ann. 859, 11 So. 222 (1892) (intention to
charge) ; Placid Oil Co. v. Frazier, 126 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (presumption of gratuity). Contra, Kiper v. Kiper, 214 La. 733, 38 So. 2d 507 (1949)
(by implication, but only after the court had in dictum referred to the presumption of gratuity); Succession of Henry, 158 La. 516, 527, 104 So. 310, 314
(1925) ("The rights of [a] legatee . . . do not depend upon any contract of
compensation with the decedent, or upon any intention on his part to have charged
for his services, while his [donor] was alive. . . . The legatee is not suing . . .
upon any contract, or upon a quantum meruit, for the recovery of the value of
his services . . . ; but is claiming title to the property bequeathed to him.").
171. 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157 (1962).
172. "Succession of Henry and Kiper . . . amply support the proposition that
services rendered gratuitously in the first instance may serve as a valid basis for
a remunerative donation." Id. at ...... 142 So. 2d at 165. The Henry and Kiper
cases each dealt with a remunerative donation to the donor's child; thus the presumption of gratuity resulting from the parent/child relationship can have no
function in remunerative donation cases. Further, the court quoted the statement
from Henry given in note 170 supra.
As to the requirement of an intention to charge, the court noted: "But those
cases . . . involved demands against successions for services rendered, the claims
being on contracts or quasi contracts. In none was a bequest made by the decedent, as here, to compensate for services performed." (Emphasis added.) Ibid.
Succession of Waechter, 131 La. 505, 59 So. 918 (1912), which had held that
the services of a child do not support a remunerative donation, was distinguished
on the ground that there the renderer was a minor living with his father at the
latter's expense, and the services were compensated by the recipient's support of
the renderer. 243 La. at ......
142 So. 2d at 165.
The majority opinion on original hearing had erroneously relied on the inapposite cases requiring an intention to charge and invoking the child/parent
presumption of gratuity. "These were not only such services that would be presumed gratuitous because of the relationship of the parties (Succession of Daste,
125 La. 657, 51 So. 677 . . . [1910] ; Succession of Templeman, 134 La. 798, 64
So. 718 [1914] and Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 40 So. 2d 21 [1949]), but were
such services that would be regarded as gratuitous in the absence of any family
relationship." Id. at ..... , 142 So. 2d at 161. Perhaps the court had in mind the
requirement of Article 1525 that the services rendered be appreciable in money,
and felt that these were not such services. See note 77, and notes 183-88 and
accompanying text, supra.
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It is suggested, however, that whether the donee is a child or
other close relative of the donor is relevant in determining the
parties' intention as to compensation; and the existence of an
intention to charge for the services would strongly support an
inference that the services are appreciable in money, without
which the services will not support a remunerative donation.
A Remunerative Donation Mortis Causa
As Remuneration for Services Rendered Subsequent to
Its Confection
The court in Succession of Formby173 found that although
the testatrix used the words "this being an onerous donation,
he having provided for me during my lifetime," she intended
that the donation mortis causa be remunerative. 1 74 Confection
of the will had preceded the testatrix' death by almost thirtythree years; but commencement of rendition of the services had
preceded the will by less than nine months.175 Opponents contended that the value of services should be determined only up
to the date of the will rather than up to the date of the testatrix' death. 176 On rehearing, a sharply divided court 177 held "it
was error to hold initially that a donation of that kind is invalid
insofar as it purports to compensate for services which the testator anticipates are to be performed subsequent to the drafting
of the testament.' ' 7 8 It is submitted that the final decision in
Formby is correct, for the language "provided for me during my
173. 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157 (1962). The court of appeal decision is at
127 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
174. This was expressly recognized in the court of appeal (127 So. 2d at 354)
and in the Supreme Court on original hearing. 243 La. at ......
142 So. 2d at 159.
The opinion on rehearing referred to the transaction throughout as a remunerative donation.
175. 243 La. at ......
142 So. 2d at 160. However, the opinion in the court of
appeal indicated that only 3 months elapsed between commencement of rendition
of the services and confection of the will. 127 So. 2d at 354. At any rate, only
a brief period had elapsed.
176. On original hearing, the court agreed with this contention, saying "the
disposition is in remuneration for a past act and must be limited to services
rendered by the donee prior and up to the date of the confection of the donation
and does not extend to services rendered thereafter." 243 La. at ....
_ 142 So. 2d
at 160.
The court on original hearing had previously said: "A remunerative donation
• . . is one having for its object the recompense of services rendered. It does not
and cannot compensate for services to be rendered in futuro." Id. at .......
142
So. 2d at 159.
177. The court on rehearing, as on original hearing, was split four to three.
Justice Sanders was the "swingman."
178. 243 La. at ......
142 So. 2d at 164. "[The testatrix] intended that the
donation made by her was to compensate her son . . . for all services rendered
up to the time of her death, which bequest is not prohibited by law." Id. at .......
142 So. 2d at 163. The court apparently felt that either two strong precedents
would have to-be overruled or the judgment on original hearing reversed: Kiper
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lifetime'' apparently evidences an intention of the testatrix to
compensate for services rendered until her death. Since this is
also the effective date of the donation mortis causa, 179 the donation in fact remunerates for past services.'i s And, as the court
pointed out,'5 ' the Civil Code does not expressly prohibit such

a bequest.

82

v. Kiper, 214 La. 733, 38 So. 2d 507 (1949) and Succession of Henry, 158 La.
516, 104 So. 310 (1925). Both these cases had evaluated the total worth of the
services by calculating together those rendered before and those rendered after
the date the will was written. The Kiper case was mentioned in Formby on
original hearing, but the court said that apparently this issue was not called to
the court's attention in Kiper. However, on rehearing the court in Formby noted
that brief of counsel in Kiper had raised the point; thus, although the court in
Kiper did not dwell on the point, it must have considered it.
Another case relied on by the majority on original hearing was distinguished
on the language of the will, which showed that it was the testator's intention to
compensate for past services only. Delaureal v. Roguet's Succession, 177 La. 815,
149 So. 464 (1933). The will there read: "I give and bequeath unto [plaintiff],
as remuneration for years of medical services, personal, close and devoted attention ...... Id. at 816, 149 So. at 464. The testator died about seven months
after confection of the will. The court held that the testator intended only to
remunerate for past services. "It is written in the present tense. The language
is not ambiguous. It relates to, and in our opinion it clearly expresses, the testator's intention to remunerate the legatee for services rendered during the years
preceding the date of the will." Id. at 817, 149 So. at 464. The court on rehearing in Formby said the case was inapposite for "the will now before us . . .
clearly expresses a desire to compensate for services rendered to the testatrix
until her death." 243 La. at ......
, 142 So. 2d at 165. This distinction seems valid
since there is no mention of an intention to compensate for services rendered
during a "lifetime" in Delaureal as there is in Formby, but only of an intention
to remunerate for years of services. However, the court on rehearing did not
mention another case relied on in the original hearing which seems to support
the court's view on original hearing. Succession of Gilbert, 222 La. 840, 64 So. 2d
192 (1953). The same Justice wrote the opinion in Gilbert and the majority
opinion on rehearing in Formby. In Gilbert a span of slightly more than three
years separated the writing of the will and the death of the testator. In arriving
at a proper evaluation of the services rendered, the court noted without discussion
and parenthetically that "(the district judge limited the proof to this date [the
date of the confection of the will] since the testator referred to services rendered
in the past)," and then evaluated the services without regard to those rendered
after confection of the will. Id. at 849, 64 So. 2d at 195. It is suggested, however,
that Gilbert could have been distinguished on the same ground as was Delaureal
v. Roguet's Succession, supra. The will in Gilbert read: "I will and bequeath to
my daughter . . . in compensation for the services which she has rendered, day
and night to my late wife, to our deceased daughter and to me." Id. at 842, 64
So. 2d at 193. This language seems to indicate an intention of the testator to
compensate only for services rendered before confection of the will ; it refers to
services rendered to persons already deceased and does not mention remuneration
during the "lifetime" of the testator.
179. LA. CIvIL COD art. 1469 (1870).
180. Succession of Formby, 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157, 164 (1962) ("A
donation mortis causa cannot and does not take effect, as a disposition of property, until the death of the testator (Revised Civil Code Article 1469). Consequently, when the remunerative donation in a testament becomes so effective, and
title to the bequeathed property is passable, it then constitutes a payment (a
dation en paiement) in keeping with an expressed desire of the testator to compensate for all services rendered prior to death.").
181. Id. at ......
142 So. 2d at 164.
182. Another ground on which the transaction could have been upheld in
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Sundry Exhortations on Remunerative Donations 83
A donation is not remunerative under Article 1525 unless the
services rendered are appreciable in money.18 The jurisprudence has held the following services unappreciable in money:
professional services of a priest;'85 services of friendship and
affection resulting from a close, intimate relationship ;186 services rendered each other by husband and wife during marriage ;157 and routine chores of a minor child that he renders
while living with his parents.'88 The donee must prove that he
Formby is that the donation was both remunerative and onerous. The jurisprudence expressly recognizes such a possibility. Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La.
1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944) ; Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910). Since
the will styled itself onerous, it could well have been held that the language "he
having provided for me during my lifetime" constituted an implied charge upon
the donee-legatee to continue to render the services as he had been doing in the
past nine months. The renderer did so in fact. One of the dissents to the opinion on rehearing hints at this possibility. 243 La. at ......
, 142 So. 2d at 167.
183. A remunerative donation mortis causa has been held not heritable; so,
where the legatee-renderer died before the testator, his share of the legacy passed
to the testator's legal heirs. Succession of Forestier, 11 So. 2d 253 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1942). The case is approved in Comment, 19 TuL. L. REV. 265 (1944).
It is not possible to tell from the opinion whether the donation was one subject
to the rules peculiar to donations, for the court merely mentioned Article 1526
without going through the process prescribed by that article. However, in this
instance it would not seem to matter whether the test of Article 1526 has been
met. The donation lapsed not because it was remunerative - and regardless of
whether it was subject to the rules peculiar to donations - but because it was
by will. The caducity prescribed by LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1697 (1870) applies only
to a "testamentary disposition" - a donation mortis causa. See the discussion
in note 159 (2d ) supra. Nevertheless, it seems the right to compensation which
the renderer had would be heritable. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1997-2019 (1870).
See generally Comment, 31 TUL. L. REV. 324, 348 (1957). In this event, the
rules considered at pages 416-28 supra would be pertinent.
It has been held that services rendered by the donee to one other than the
donor will support a remunerative donation, at least if the donor was under
obligation to the recipient. White v. White, 7 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942)
(husband failed to pay alimony to wife as ordered by court; services performed
by children to support her, named as consideration in deed, will support transfer
of immovable property from husband to children if value of property does not
exceed by one-half value of services).
In Succession of Viola, 138 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), it was held
that a transfer from the recipient to the renderer in the form of a sale could not
be considered a remunerative donation when the stated consideration, in addition
to the recognition of past services, consisted of cash previously advanced by the
renderer to the recipient and the assumption of a mortgage on the property by
the renderer. See notes 135-39 supra, and accompanying text, for similar holdings
with respect to onerous donations.
184. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1525 (1870). E.g., Succession of Formby, 243 La.
120, 142 So. 2d 157 (1962) ; Succession of Henry, 158 La. 516, 104 So. 310
(1925) ; Succession of Formby, 127 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Placid
Oil Co. v. Frazier, 126 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
185. Continental Oil Co. v. Tate, 211 La. 852, 30 So. 2d 858 (1947).
186. Succession of Rabasse, 49 La. Ann. 1405, 22 So. 767 (1897).
187. Succession of Ames, 33 La. Ann. 1317 (1881) ; Williams v. Hardy, 15
La. Ann. 286 (1860).
188. Succession of Waechter, 131 La. 505, 59 So. 918 (1912).
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has in fact rendered the services," 9 but the burden of proving
that the test of Article 1526 has not been met is on the party
attacking the donation.'" However, the rule has been announced
that "where a remunerative donation exceeds the disposable portion, the donee or legatee carries the burden of [proving] the
value of the services performed."' 191
If the renderer is indebted to the recipient in an amount exceeding the value of the services, compensation occurs by operation of law eliminating the possibility of a remunerative dona-2
19
tion to the former in recognition of the services rendered.
Likewise, recompense by the donor for his care and support by
contributing to expenses of running the donee's household, and
by performing services beneficial to the donee, may destroy care
and support of the donor as the basis for a remunerative dona193
tion.
If the remunerative donation is determined not subject to
the rules peculiar to donations, it must be recorded in the conveyance book rather than in the separate book provided for
registering donations. 9 4 Furthermore, such a donation is not
revocable by reason of ingratitude of the donee. 95 However, if
the value of the thing given amounts to as much as one and one189. Succession of Formby, 243 La. 120, 142 So. 2d 157 (1962) ; Almond v.
Adams, 221 La. 234, 59 So. 2d 132 (1952) ; Winbarg v. Winbarg, 177 La. 1071,
150 So. 21 (1933) ; Succession of Fox, 2 Rob. 292 (La. 1842) ; Heirs of Cole v.
Cole's Executors, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 414 (La. 1829); Succession of Formby, 127
So. 2d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
190. Whitman v. Whitman, 206 La. 1, 18 So. 2d 633 (1944); Bowlus v.
Whatley, 129 La. 509, 513, 56 So. 423, 424 (1911) (complaint that descendant
in title of renderer failed to prove value of the services; no invasion of legitime:
Held, "where a conveyance, purporting to be a remunerative donation, is attacked,
on the ground that the value of the property donated exceeds by one-half that of
the services intended to be compensated, the burden of making this proof is on
the party making the allegation.") ; Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53 So. 17
(1910) ; Placid Oil Co. v. Frazier, 126 So. 2d 800, 802 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961)
("Where the validity of a remunerative donation is questioned, the burden rests
upon the opponents to prove that the value of the property donated exceeds by
one-half the value of the services rendered.").
191. Succession of Formby, 127 So. 2d 352, 356 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
Accord, Winbarg v. Winbarg, 177 La. 1071, 150 So. 21 (1933) ; Succession of
Fox, 2 Rob. 292, 293 (La. 1842) ("If a remunerative donation exceed the disposable portion, the donee or legatee is bound to prove the value of his services."
Case remanded to determine if legitime invaded.).
192. LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 2207, 2208 (1870) ; Boggs v. Hays, 44 La. Ann. 859,
11 So. 222 (1892).
193. Boggs v. Hays, supra note 192.
194. Bowlus v. Whatley, 129 La. 509, 56 So. 423 (1911) (not a servicesabout-the-home case). LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1554 (1870) provides for registry of
donations in a separate book.
195. White v. White, 7 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). See LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1559(1) (1870).
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half times the value of the services, the remunerative donation
must be in proper form ;190 and reservation of the usufruct by

the donor will vitiate the transfer if the thing donated is immovable property. 197
Suggestions for Treatment of Remunerative
Donations
Although some exaggerated and unlikely situations are imaginable where injustice might be worked,""8 the Civil Code provides a workable, practical, and fair solution to the workaday
problems involving remunerative donations. It is submitted that
in the future the courts should rely even more on the provisions
of Article 1526 to determine whether remunerative transactions
are subject to the rules peculiar to donations. 1' 9 When a remunerative donation is attacked for defects of either form or
substance, the first determination should be whether the services can be appreciated in money; if so, then their value and
the value of the object given should be found. The test of Article 1526 should then be utilized: If the value of the thing given
does not exceed by one-half the value of the services rendered,
the remunerative donation is not a real donation, but an 2 onerous contract not subject to the rules peculiar to donations. '0 Of
196. Pulfford v. )inimick, 107 Li. 403, 31 So. 879 (1902) (not a servicesabout-the-home case) ;Bordelon v. Brown, 84 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
197. Almond v. Adnms, 221 La. 234, 59 So. 2d 132 (1.952) ; Placid Oil Co. v.
Frazier, 126 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1.961).
In Caraway v. Leblanc, 1 La. App. 192 (1st Cir. 1924), a remunerative donation was annulled on the ground it was proscribed by Article 1497. However, in
Tucker v. Angell, 1 La. App. 577 (2d Cir. 1925), a remunerative donation attacked on the grouml that it violated Article 1.497 was upheld, the court distinguishing certain onerous-donation cases on the ground that "the service and
attention mentioned in the deed [in this case] did not purport to be such as were
to be rendered but such as had been rendered." Id. at 580.
198. For example, a hypothetical situation might be posed in which the reaijuerative donation was for $1,500,000, and the services were found to be worth
$1,000,001. Strict adherence to Article 1.526 would mean that the renderer was
getting $499,999 more than his services were worth. But it is difficult to imagine
a situation in which services would reach such a figure.
199. Cases, new and old, have failed to use Article 1526 in adjudicating the
cause before then. E.g., Succession of Faust, 189 rAt. .117, 179 So. 583 (M38)
Graves v. Graves, .10 La. Ann. 212 (1855).
200. Several cases have said that rendition of services creates an obligation
and that extinguishmiaet of this obligation is a legAd basis for the transfer of
property. Kiper v. Kiper, 214 La. 733, 38 So. 2d 507 (1949); Succession of
Henry, 158 La. 516, 104 So. 310 (1925); Bowlus v. Whatley, 1.29 La. 509, 56
So. 423 (1911); Robinson v. Guedry, 181 So. 882 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 19-38).
The courts have not been careful in defining the nature of this obligation. "However, as I view this case, if the act of conveyance is a donation, it is a renunerative donation [not subject to the rules peculiar to donations] which in effect
means that the donor says-'I owe you something for what you have done for
me and I now want to pay you by giving you such property.' It is paying a debt,
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course, difficult questions of fact will arise in determining
whether the services can be evaluated in money and in determining their value. If the courts adhere to the formula given
in Article 1526, much confusion could be eliminated from this
20 1
area of the law.
Andrew J. S. Jumonville
either moral or legal." (Emphasis added.) White v. White, 7 So. 2d 255, 257
(La. App. 2d Cir. 19-2). However, see the discussion concerning moral and
natural obligations at text accompanying notes 55-63 supra. Thus, the remunerative donation has at times been referred to as a giving in payment. Cases cited
supra. Contra, Greco v. Millano. 13 Or]. App. 134, 140 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1916)
("But we are sure that a dation en paiement is not a donation.") If a recipient
sees fit to recompense his benefactor, and the appreciable monetary value of the
services is little inferior to that of the gift (i.e., more than two-thirds of the value
of the gift), then the legislature has said, in Article 1526, that the transferor
cannot b6 considered moved by a spirit of liberality, but by a sense of duty. Thus,
he is paying, not giving. And( "giving in payment" seems as appropriate a name
as any by which to refer to the transaction, although possibly not so technically
correct as a "remvneratieve donation not subject to the rules of donations." Cf.
Hebert & Lazarus, SOme Problems Regarding Price iv the Louisiana Law of
;Sales, 4 LA. I,. REV. 378, 381 (1942) : "Article 1523 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
distinguishing between gratuitous donations and tie so-called remunerative and
onerous donations, has no counterpart in the Code Napoleon. Whatever the nature
of these contracts, it is clear that they are not real donations when the purpose
.of the transfer is to recompense the transferee for services wbich he has rendered.
. . . Accordingly, it is not only misleading but erroneous to refer to such transfers as donations for such transactions are in effect commutative contracts of a
different nature. But the term 'remunerative or onerous donations' is widely used
both here and in France." It has been said that a giving in payment requires a
fixed price-Bowlus v. Whatley, supra; Pulford v. Dimmick, 107 La. 403, 31
So. 879 (1902); Kleinpeter v. Harrigan, 21 la. Ann. 196 (1869) -but
that a
remunerative donation does not-Bowlus v. Whatley, supra; Hearsey v. Craig,
126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910) ; Robinson v. Guedry, supra. This is objectionable.
The article relied on for the requirement that a dation en paiemeat have a fixed
price is Article 2464, which provides that the "price of the sale must be certain,
that is to say, fixed and determined by the parties." The giving in payment is
subject to the rules of sale unless otherwise provided. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2659
(1870). It is suggested that this article means not that a monetary figure must
be arrived at and mentioned in the sale, but that the parties must agree either to
a price or on some way to determine one. If this is correct, then it would be
necessary that a dation en paiemett have a certain price only in this sense, and
not in the sense used in the above cases. Furthermore, although it is not (Succession of Henry, supra) and should not be necessary that the parties fix and
state the value of the thing given or the services rendered
in the act of donation,
yet it will become necessary to determine the "price" of the remunerative donation if it is subsequently attacked, in order to go through the process prescribed
by Article 1526. This last is recognized in I ersey v. Craig 126 La. 824, 83.3,
53 So. 17, 20 (1910).
201. Compare the clear analysis of Article Vi26 in Rlobinson v. (uedry, 181
So. 882 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) with the cases cited in note .199supra, and
Succession of Jackson, 47 La. Ann. 1089, 17 So. 598 (1895) ; Boggs v. Hays. 44
La. Ann. 859, 1.1 So. 222 (1892) ; and Succession of Cuculln, 4 Rob. 397 (I'a.
1843).

